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I. Introduction 
[T]he Hobby Lobby decision will reverberate across corporate 
America. It will reshape fundamentally how business people, 
lawyers, legal and business scholars (particularly, corporate 
law professors), as well as ordinary citizens, think about the 
permitted objectives of business corporations in a free society, 
objectives that extend far beyond those that are religiously 
1188 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1187 (2017) 
motivated and into the larger realm of corporate social 
responsibility of all kinds.1 
Law . . . mandates—with the state’s full sanctioning power 
behind it—compliance with specified standards of behavior. 
Apart from a decision to comply or disobey, there is no real 
exercise of discretion in choosing to abide by the law. 
“Responsible” conduct, on the other hand, presupposes the 
freedom to engage in or refrain from certain conduct. Viewed 
this way, corporate responsibility concerns can be seen as 
picking up precisely where legal strictures leave off.2 
With deep appreciation and admiration for the work of 
Lyman Johnson and David Millon, I offer this contribution to the 
Symposium that honors them and their scholarship. The 
language quoted above provides the foundation for this Essay. 
The first quotation describes the potentially significant 
implications of the now three-year-old Supreme Court case, 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,3 for understanding corporate 
purpose and corporate social responsibility. The second quotation 
from Johnson’s work distinguishes between what companies are 
required to do (they must comply with applicable law) and what 
companies choose to do for the betterment of society’s individuals 
and institutions (corporate social responsibility).  
I mentioned in my presentation at the Symposium that I 
have a narrow but significant quibble with Johnson’s assertion in 
the second quotation that, when it comes to compliance, “there is 
no real exercise of discretion in choosing to abide by the law.”4 I 
think that there is a great amount of discretion to be exercised by 
corporate officers when it comes to compliance. It is discretion 
relating to how the corporation will “abide by the law.”5 In other 
                                                                                                     
 * Harold F. McNiece Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of 
Law. 
 1. Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, 70 
BUS. LAW. 1, 2–3 (2015) [hereinafter Johnson & Millon, After Hobby Lobby]. 
 2. Lyman Johnson, Law and Legal Theory in the History of Corporate 
Responsibility: Corporate Personhood, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1135, 1135 (2012) 
[hereinafter Johnson, Corporate Personhood] 
 3. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), aff’g 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013); Conestoga 
Wood Specialties Corp. v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), rev’g 724 F.3d 377 (3d 
Cir. 2013). After granting certiorari, both cases were consolidated. Sebelius v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013). 
 4. Johnson, Corporate Personhood, supra note 2, at 1135. 
 5. Id. 
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words, the discretion is not limited to the choice of whether to 
follow the law, but is found in the choices corporate officers make, 
sometimes implicitly, about whether to follow the spirit of the law 
or merely the letter of the law. The discretion is exercised when 
making decisions about how compliance programs are created 
and implemented, and how their effectiveness is assessed. 
I quibble also with Johnson’s observation that “corporate 
responsibility concerns can be seen as picking up precisely where 
legal strictures leave off.”6 Compliance with the legal strictures 
Johnson speaks of is an important part of corporate governance.7 
It seems to me, however, that the line between corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility is blurred. While 
law compliance is mandated, the quality of that compliance is 
within corporate officers’ discretion.8 Officers may decide to do 
the bare minimum when it comes to compliance.9 Compliance 
programs are sometimes mere window dressing or cosmetic in 
nature.10 The decision to create robust compliance programs that 
take seriously the substance of legal strictures is not only good 
corporate governance; it is socially responsible.11 I believe there is 
                                                                                                     
 6. Id. 
 7. See H. Lowell Brown, The Corporate Director’s Compliance Oversight 
Responsibility in the Post Caremark Era, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (2001) (“For 
corporations operating in regulated industries, compliance with the applicable 
laws is essential . . . . Thus, the avoidance of a regulatory crisis may be as 
significant to the corporation's long-term well-being as is strategic planning and 
product innovation.”). 
 8. See Maurice E. Stucke, In Search of Effective Ethics and Compliance 
Programs, 39 J. CORP. L. 769, 800–01 (2014) (“Particularly in times of shrinking 
budgets and restricted resources it would be very helpful to have some evidence 
to demonstrate why a solid compliance program is needed—and why a better 
program is worth the effort versus a bare bones minimum.” (citing ETHICS RES. 
CTR., THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR ORGANIZATIONS AT TWENTY 
YEARS: A CALL TO ACTION FOR MORE EFFECTIVE PROMOTION AND RECOGNITION OF 
EFFECTIVE COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS PROGRAMS 44 (2012))). 
 9. See id. at 800–01, 821 (discussing the possibility of minimum 
investment in compliance as a means of corporate policy or management). 
 10. See HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE ASS’N, IS YOUR COMPLIANCE PROGRAM 
EFFECTIVE OR MERELY WINDOW DRESSING? (Mar. 9, 2015), http://www.hcca-
info.org/Portals/0/PDFs/Resources/Conference_Handouts/Compliance_Institute/
2014/mon/211print2.pdf (highlighting “Hallmarks of [Compliance] Window 
Dressing” in the healthcare industry). 
 11. See Sarah A. Altschuller, Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Compliance: A Functional Convergence, FOLEY HOAG (Aug. 11, 2016), 
http://www.csrandthelaw.com/2016/08/11/corporate-social-responsibility-and-
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a great deal of overlap between corporate governance and 
corporate social responsibility and very little precision in 
understanding where corporate governance ends and corporate 
social responsibility begins. 
At the Symposium, Johnson offered an observation about my 
presentation during the question and answer period. “Compliance 
is substance, the duty of care is process,” he said.12 Johnson’s 
insight helps to frame and clarify my thesis in this Essay. The 
substance about which Johnson speaks is found in the legal 
mandates—i.e., the law to which corporations must comply.13 The 
process to which he refers is the stuff of corporate governance.14 
The process includes a board’s decision to establish a compliance 
program.15 The process also relates to the measures undertaken 
by corporate officers who are responsible for the implementation 
and management of compliance programs.16 These processes are 
undertaken by corporate officers in order to fulfill the fiduciary 
duties they owe their shareholders and the corporation for whom 
they serve.17 A commitment to taking compliance obligations 
seriously must become part of the fabric of corporate culture.18 
                                                                                                     
compliance-a-functional-convergence/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2017) (“There are 
strong business reasons, therefore, to leverage and integrate CSR commitments 
and compliance processes.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 12. Symposium, Corporate Law, Governance, and Purpose: A Tribute to the 
Scholarship of Lyman Johnson and David Millon, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 677 
(2017). 
 13. See Baccei v. United States, 632 F.3d 1140, 1145 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Full 
compliance is necessary when the requirement relates to the substance of the 
statute or where the essential purposes have not been fulfilled.” (citing Shotgun 
Delivery, Inc. v. United States, 269 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2001))). 
 14. See In re NVIDIA Corp. Derivative Litig., No. C-06-06110-SBA (JCS), 
2008 WL 5382544, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2008) (“As corporate debacles such 
as Enron, Tyco and WorldCom demonstrate, strong corporate governance is 
fundamental to the economic well-being and success of a corporation.”). 
 15. See Brown, supra note 7, at 6 (discussing the role of the board and 
compliance personnel to take measures ensuring that the laws are dutifully 
observed). 
 16. See id. at 108 (“Specific individual(s) within high-level personnel of the 
organization must have been assigned overall responsibility to oversee 
compliance with such standards and procedures.”). 
 17. See generally id. But see Mercer Bullard, Caremark’s Irrelevance, 10 
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 15, 16–17 (2013) (arguing that compliance standards impose 
higher expected costs on corporations than the standard under Caremark). 
 18. See Brown, supra note 7, at 6 (“For corporations operating in regulated 
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Boards must demand that adequate compliance programs are 
installed and diligently implemented.19 Once installed, corporate 
officers do the work of implementing compliance programs.20 
Johnson’s work is illuminating on the link between effective 
compliance and the advice that officers get from in-house counsel 
concerning their fiduciary duties.21 Johnson and Millon’s work 
regarding corporate personhood and purpose is also relevant to 
my thesis in this Essay about the overlap, interplay, and 
interaction between corporate governance and corporate social 
responsibility.22  
I begin the Essay with an examination of the overlap 
between corporate governance and corporate social 
responsibility.23 After doing so, I explore the notions of corporate 
personhood and purpose in order to suggest ways to make 
compliance programs less cosmetic and defensive and more 
meaningful and effective.24 I conclude that the decision-making 
inherent in corporate governance is an important factor in the 
corporate social responsibility equation.25 There is a gap that 
separates the fulfillment of fiduciary duties (including the 
installation and upkeep of a compliance program) and best 
practices.26 Companies and their managers can win litigation, or 
                                                                                                     
industries, compliance with the applicable laws is essential.”). 
 19. See id. (discussing the various guidelines in place to ensure that 
corporations implement satisfactory compliance programs). 
 20. See id. at 119–127 (generally describing the function and procedure 
that should be followed by compliance officials in implementing effective 
compliance programs). 
 21. See generally Johnson & Millon, After Hobby Lobby, supra note 1; 
Johnson, Corporate Personhood, supra note 2; Johnson, Corporate Governance, 
infra note 70; Johnson & Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers are 
Fiduciaries, infra note 105; Johnson, Business Judgment, infra note 111; 
Johnson & Garvis, infra note 113. 
 22. See generally Johnson & Millon, After Hobby Lobby, supra note 1; 
Johnson & Millon, infra note 105. 
 23. See infra notes 28–81 and accompanying text (discussing the overlap 
between corporate governance and corporate social responsibility). 
 24. See infra notes 120–152 and accompanying text (exploring issues of 
corporate personhood and purpose); infra notes 235–281 (discussing the effect of 
corporate personhood corporate purpose). 
 25. See infra notes 320–334 and accompanying text (concluding that the 
decision-making portion of corporate governance is an integral part of corporate 
social responsibility). 
 26. See Lightfoot v. District of Columbia, 339 F. Supp. 2d. 78, 82 n.1 (D.C. 
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perhaps even avoid litigation, that alleges fiduciary duty breach 
by doing the bare minimum.27 But, what can inspire them to 
adhere to best practices, particularly when it comes to installing 
and maintaining an effective compliance program? My answer to 
this question in this Essay requires an exploration of how 
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility are not 
clearly separate, and an examination of corporate personhood and 
purpose that may inspire businesses to adhere to best practices. 
II. Good Corporate Governance as Corporate Social Responsibility 
I begin my discussion about how to make corporate 
compliance programs meaningful and effective by looking at 
definitions of compliance, corporate governance, and corporate 
social responsibility (CSR). 
According to the Financial Times, “CSR is a concept with 
many definitions and practices.”28 CSR can be defined in a way 
that focuses on the impact of corporate activity on the 
constituencies that are affected by the decisions that corporate 
agents and actors make.29 These constituencies include corporate 
stakeholders—employees, creditors, consumers, suppliers, and 
the communities in which a company conducts business.30 Some 
definitions of CSR look beyond stakeholders to the effects of a 
company’s activities on general social wellbeing.31 Like Johnson, 
                                                                                                     
Cir. 2006) (“[T]he term ‘best practices’ often tends to be murky and 
ambiguous.”). 
 27. See Stucke, supra note 8, at 800–01, 821 (discussing the possibility of 
minimum investment in compliance as a means of corporate policy or 
management). 
 28. Definition of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), FIN. TIMES, 
http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=corporate-social-responsibility--(CSR) (last 
visited Apr. 6, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 29. See id. (“Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a business approach 
that contributes to sustainable development by delivering economic, social and 
environmental benefits for all stakeholders.”). 
 30. See Definition of Stakeholders, FIN. TIMES, http://lexicon.ft. 
com/Term?term=stakeholders (last visited Apr. 6, 2017) (“Typical stakeholders 
that define most businesses are customers, employees, suppliers, communities, 
and shareholders or other financiers.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 31. See Corporate Social Responsibility, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www. 
investopedia.com/terms/c/corp-social-responsibility.asp (last visited Apr. 6, 2017) 
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those who subscribe to this way of defining CSR look beyond 
what is required by law to protect stakeholders, looking instead 
to the discretion that corporate managers and officers may 
exercise in choosing to benefit society by doing something extra 
for the people (whether stakeholders or not) touched by corporate 
activity.32  
Sometimes CSR definitions make no reference to 
stakeholders or the company’s impact on the public’s wellbeing.33 
These definitions focus on society and general social welfare, not 
how companies impact stakeholders or other members of society 
with whom the company comes in contact.34 For example, one 
commentator described CSR as the “business practices involving 
initiatives that benefit society.”35  
Definitions of Corporate Governance are also conceptually 
varied.36 Investopedia defines corporate governance as “the 
system of rules, practices and processes by which a company is 
directed and controlled . . . . [E]ssentially [it] involves balancing 
the interests of a company’s many stakeholders, such as 
shareholders, management, customers, suppliers, financiers, 
government and the community.”37 Robert Monks and Nell 
Minow define corporate governance as “the relationship among 
                                                                                                     
(“[CSR] is a corporation’s initiatives to assess and take responsibility for the 
company’s effects on environmental and social wellbeing. The term generally 
applies to efforts that go beyond what may be required by regulation or 
environmental protection groups.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 32. See Johnson, Corporate Personhood, supra note 2, at 1135 
(distinguishing between CSR and the governance procedures implemented in 
accordance with “legal strictures”). 
 33. See Sammi Caramela, What is Corporate Social Responsibility, BUS. 
NEWS DAILY (June 27, 2016, 12:12 PM), www.businessnewsdaily.com/4679-
corporate-social-responsibility.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2017) (referencing CSR 
as a business’ relationship to society generally, while making no mention of 
stakeholders) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 34. See id. (“Corporate social responsibility (CSR) refers to business 
practices involving initiatives that benefit society.”). 
 35. Id. 
 36. See infra notes 37–47 and accompanying text (providing definitions of 
“corporate governance” that vary depending on the focus given responsibilities 
to shareholders over other parties). 
 37. Corporate Governance, INVESTOPEDIA, www.investopedia.com/terms/ 
c/corporategovernance.asp (last visited Apr. 6, 2017) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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various participants in determining the direction and 
performance of corporations. The primary participants are (1) the 
shareholders, (2) the management (led by the chief executive 
officer), and (3) the board of directors . . . . Other participants 
include the employees, customers, suppliers, creditors, and the 
community.”38 These definitions of corporate governance look 
beyond shareholders and managers and include stakeholders.39 
In these definitions, there is an obvious overlap between 
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility in the 
inclusion of stakeholders, including the community, when 
defining both concepts.40 
Monks and Minow, however, see shareholders, management, 
and boards as the primary participants in corporate governance.41 
Under their definition, the primary focus in corporate governance 
is on processes, practices, policies, and norms that are internal to 
the corporation.42 In contrast to this, when considering CSR, the 
primary focus looks beyond internal constituents, the 
stakeholders, or, under many definitions, beyond stakeholders to 
general social welfare and wellbeing.43 Internal matters and 
decision-making are the focal point of corporate governance.44 
External matters are at the center of CSR considerations.45 This 
boundary that separates the external from the internal when 
distinguishing corporate governance from CSR, however, is far 
                                                                                                     
 38. ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 75 (2d ed. 
2001). 
 39. See supra note 30 (“Typical stakeholders that define most businesses 
are customers, employees, suppliers, communities, and shareholders or other 
financiers.”). 
 40. Compare supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text (highlighting the 
relationship between CSR and stakeholders), with supra notes 33–39 and 
accompanying text (highlighting the relationship between corporate governance 
and stakeholders). 
 41. See generally MONKS & MINOW, supra note 38 and accompanying text 
(stating that the primary participants in corporate governance are shareholders, 
management, and boards of directors). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Caramela, supra note 33 (defining CSR). 
 44. See ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 6 (3d 
ed. 2004) (focusing on “the three most significant players in the corporate 
process: shareholders, managers, and directors”). 
 45. See Caramela, supra note 33 (“Corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
refers to business practices involving initiatives that benefit society.”). 
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from clear.46 Both concepts are defined by referring to both 
internal constituencies (shareholders, officers, and directors) and 
external groups (stakeholders and communities).47  
The line of demarcation that separates corporate governance 
from CSR is further blurred by the fact that an important aspect 
of corporate governance includes compliance work.48 Corporate 
compliance, like CSR and corporate governance, involves policies 
and practices that are both internal and external to the 
corporation.49 Compliance involves “the processes by which an 
organization seeks to ensure that employees and other 
constituents conform to applicable norms—which can include 
either the requirements of laws or regulations or the internal 
rules of the organization.”50 Additionally, “[t]he contemporary 
compliance function serves a core governance function. . . . But, 
unlike other governance structures, its origins are exogenous to 
the firm.”51 
Compliance involves internal governance processes to comply 
with law, regulations, and norms created by sources that are 
external to the firm.52 It is clear that, as Johnson wrote, “there is 
                                                                                                     
 46. See MONKS & MINOW, supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing 
corporate governance as dealing with both internal players—shareholders, 
managers, and directors—and external considerations—employees, the 
community, etc.). 
 47. Compare supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text (defining CSR with 
reference to both internal and external constituencies), with supra notes 33–39 
and accompanying text (defining corporate governance with reference to both 
internal and external constituencies). 
 48. See Nadelle Grossman, Director Compliance with Elusive Fiduciary 
Duties in a Climate of Corporate Governance Reform, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & 
FIN. L. 393, 425–26 (2007) (“Internal control systems pervade every corporate 
enterprise, and include systems designed to provide assurances as to the 
effectiveness and efficiency of operations, reliability of financial reporting and 
compliance with law.”). 
 49. See id. at 395–97, 425–426 (discussing the public impact of poor 
corporate governance and the need to balance interests of the corporation and 
its stockholders). 
 50. GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT AND 
COMPLIANCE 3 (2014). 
 51. Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075, 2078 (2016). 
 52. See id. at 2079 (“[T]he imposition of intrafirm governance from 
extrafirm sources introduces a host of outside interests and incentives into firm 
decision making.”). 
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no real exercise of discretion in choosing to abide by the law.”53 
The type of internal processes that encourage compliance, 
however, and the extent to which a company takes them 
seriously, is voluntary and discretionary.54 Even the decision 
about whether to adopt a compliance program involves a certain 
amount of discretion.55 
CSR, on the other hand, is almost entirely discretionary and 
includes things like charitable donations.56 This is the something 
extra that companies do to be good citizens—to be responsible.57 
But CSR can also be intertwined with internal processes that 
involve compliance.58 Companies can, and too often do, install 
programs that monitor compliance with the letter of the law 
rather than the spirit of the law.59 These companies behave in a 
way that is socially irresponsible when they spend large sums of 
                                                                                                     
 53. Johnson, Corporate Personhood, supra note 2, at 1135. Even the 
strictest adherents to shareholder primacy and wealth maximization 
acknowledge that all firms must comply with applicable law even in their quest 
to maximize profits. See ERIC W. ORTS, BUSINESS PERSONS xvii (2013) 
[T]he economist Milton Friedman argues that business executives 
should act in accordance with the desires of the company’s owners, 
“which generally will be to make as much money as possible.” 
Friedman also agrees, however, that the executive must also do so 
“while conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those 
embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom. 
Id. 
 54. See Stucke, supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing the degree 
of discretion afforded officers in compliance). 
55. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c)(1) (2016) (stating that “the 
board of directors may” create a given committee for whatever specified purpose 
the board may define (emphasis added)). 
 56. See Caramela, supra note 33 (including philanthropy, volunteering, and 
environmental preservation efforts as categories of CSR). 
 57. See id. (“Corporate social responsibility (CSR) refers to business 
practices involving initiatives that benefit society. A business's CSR can 
encompass a wide variety of tactics, from giving away a portion of a company's 
proceeds to charity, to implementing ‘greener’ business operations.”). 
 58. See Ronen Shamir, Capitalism, Governance, and Authority: The Case of 
Corporate Social Responsibility, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 531, 534–35 (2010) 
(highlighting studies involving various types of compliance and their 
relationship to the self-regulation that is integral to CSR compliance). 
 59. See Stucke, supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing the 
potential to do “bare bones minimum” in terms of compliance). 
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money on compliance programs that are not effective and 
meaningful.60 
A company that behaves in a socially responsible way will 
take compliance seriously.61 One way to do this is to avoid the 
check-the-box approach to creating and implementing compliance 
programs.62 Installation of a program is only the first step. A 
socially responsible company will make sure that problems are 
addressed when compliance measures uncover them.63 
Responsible companies will work hard to prevent recurring 
wrongdoing.64 Socially responsible companies will protect 
whistleblowers (not just say they do) so that there are no 
repercussions for employees who report wrongdoing.65  
Effective compliance programs require information flow from 
employees who are deep “in the interior of the organization” to 
senior managers and executives who are charged with monitoring 
law compliance.66 And, senior managers must adequately 
                                                                                                     
 60. See Aaron Chatterji & Siona Listokin, Corporate Social Responsibility, 
DEMOCRACY: J. IDEAS (Winter 2007), http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/3/ 
corporate-social-irresponsibility/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2017) (evaluating the 
actual success of CSR campaigns on effecting corporate behavior because large 
companies are simply better able to spend large amounts of money on CSR and 
compliance) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 61. See Shamir, supra note 58, at 539 (describing CSR as “a set of practices 
that lie beyond compliance,” with legal mechanism compliance as a baseline). 
 62. See generally Cindy Yanasak & Eileen Xenarios, Culture-Shift: Moving 
from a Check-the-Box Mentality to One of Ethical Performance, COMPLIANCE & 
ETHICS INST.—SOC’Y CORP. COMPLIANCE & ETHICS (Sept. 2014), 
http://www.slideshare.net/theSCCE/culture-shift-moving-from-a-checkthebox-
mentality-to-one-of-ethical-performance (last visited Apr. 6, 2017) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
63. See Brown, supra note 7, at 131 (“[T]he company must be vigilant in 
preventing possible violations and in responding to violations that occur by 
taking appropriate remedial measures and disciplinary action.”). 
 64. See id. at 131 (“A compliance program should be grounded on legal and 
regulatory requirements that are applicable and specifically, the requirements 
that govern the particular business activities of the corporation.”). 
 65. See Tim Barnett, Why Your Company Should Have a Whistleblowing 
Policy, SAM ADVANCED MGMT. J., Autumn 1992, at 37–42 (encouraging the 
adoption of policies that protect and encourage the reporting of concerns and 
whistleblowing). 
 66. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968–70 
(Del. Ch. 1996) (“As the facts of this case graphically demonstrate, ordinary 
business decisions that are made by officers and employees deeper in the 
interior of the organization can, however, vitally affect the welfare of the 
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communicate with mid-level managers and low-level employees 
about the firm’s compliance goals and requirements.67 This 
information is conveyed in employee training programs.68 
The impact a company has on communities, on labor, on 
consumers, as both Johnson and Millon have noted in their work, 
is regulated by environmental, labor and consumer laws that 
have nothing to do with corporate governance.69 The laws that 
protect stakeholders are external to the corporation.70 But the 
nature and adequacy of a company’s compliance with law is an 
internal corporate governance matter.71 Has the company 
installed a compliance program just to be able to defend itself 
against litigation or prosecution? Is the compliance program 
merely cosmetic window dressing? Affirmative answers to these 
questions mean that the company’s behavior is not socially 
responsible. 
                                                                                                     
corporation and its ability to achieve its various strategic and financial goals.”). 
But see Bullard, supra note 17, at 16–17 (concluding that Caremark is an 
inadequate source for encouraging legal compliance and arguing that the 
agencies that are charged with enforcing laws are the most able to encourage 
corporations to comply with applicable law). 
 67. See Corder v. United States, 107 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 1997) (granting 
an alternative monetary sanction instead of disqualification sanction to a store 
owner by virtue of the store owner’s comprehensive compliance policy and 
effective employee training program). 
 68. See id. at 597 (finding that employer had engaged in comprehensive 
employee training programs). 
 69. See, e.g., David Millon, Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Environmental Sustainability, in COMPANY LAW AND SUSTAINABILITY: LEGAL 
BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES 35 (Beate Sjåfjell & Benjamin J. Richardson eds., 
2015) (highlighting the relationship of compliance to environmental law and 
corporate social responsibility). 
 70. See Lyman Johnson, Law and the History of Corporate Responsibility: 
Corporate Governance, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 974, 981–82 (2013) [hereinafter 
Johnson, Corporate Governance] (detailing the distinction between external 
“positive law” and internal “soft law,” laws such as Sarbanes–Oxley and Dodd–
Frank that focus on shareholder interest from outside the internal mechanism 
of the corporate governance). 
 71. See id. at 981  
[Sarbanes-Oxley] corresponded with growth in the promulgation of 
“soft law” associated with corporate activity. Corporations 
increasingly adopted internal codes of conduct and committee 
charters . . . . These various nonbinding initiatives did not have the 
legal “bite” of positive law, but they served to alter internally the 
evolving normative expectations as to what responsible corporate 
conduct should look like. 
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A socially responsible company takes compliance with law 
seriously.72 It measures the effectiveness of its compliance 
programs on a regular basis.73 If there are shortcomings in the 
program, or if problems are discovered, a socially responsible 
company quickly and effectively deals with them.74 Adequate 
compliance programs protect stakeholders’ interests.75 They may 
also impact social welfare in general.76 This is the definition of 
CSR.77 In other words, effective compliance is good corporate 
governance and these internal processes have benefits that 
reverberate beyond the corporation’s shareholders and managers 
to reach its stakeholders and the general public.78 This is the crux 
of my disagreement with Johnson when he wrote that “corporate 
responsibility concerns can be seen as picking up precisely where 
                                                                                                     
 72. See Shamir, supra note 58, at 539 (describing CSR as “a set of practices 
that lie beyond compliance,” with legal mechanism compliance as a baseline). 
 73. See Sarah A. Altschuller, Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Compliance: Commitment at the Top, FOLEY HOAG (Sept. 21, 2016), 
http://www.csrandthelaw.com/2016/09/21/corporate-social-responsibility-and-
compliance-commitment-at-the-top/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2017) (“Moments of 
crisis are not the time for corporate leaders to realize that a company’s 
commitments, often prominently displayed on websites and in glossy reports, 
have not been effectively implemented. On an ongoing basis, top-level 
management and the board are in a position to raise questions regarding the 
processes . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 74. Id. 
 75. See Sarah A. Altschuller, Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Compliance: Building Capacity to Respond to Stakeholder Demands, FOLEY 
HOAG (Aug. 18, 2016), http://www.csrandthelaw.com/2016/08/18/corporate-
social-responsibility-and-compliance-building-capacity-to-respond-to-
stakeholder-demands/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2017) (“In light of evolving 
stakeholder expectations, integrating CSR commitments into a company’s 
compliance programs presents opportunities for both enhanced performance and 
operational efficiencies.”) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review); see 
also Celia R. Taylor, Carpe Crisis: Capitalizing on the Breakdown of Capitalism 
to Consider the Creation of Social Businesses, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 743, 745 
(2009/2010) (“A ‘socially responsible corporation’ may take into consideration the 
interests of other stakeholders in the enterprise, including but not limited to 
employees, customers, and suppliers.”). 
 76. See Taylor, supra note 75, at 746 (stating that “the active advancement 
of social welfare is, at times, an appropriate and laudable corporate activity”). 
 77. See supra notes 28–35 and accompanying text (defining CSR). 
 78. See, e.g., Cheryl L. Wade, Corporate Governance as Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Empathy and Race Discrimination, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1461, 1464–
68 (2002) (discussing how proper levels of empathetic corporate governance can 
“positively [effect] racial discourse”). 
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legal strictures leave off.”79 Compliance with legal strictures and 
corporate social responsibility are intertwined in a way that it is 
impossible to see where one ends and the other begins.80 
Understanding this helps to unravel why many companies install 
compliance programs that encourage adherence to the letter of 
the law rather than the spirit of the law.  
III. Contextualizing: Diversity Discussions vs. Monitoring 
Compliance with Antidiscrimination Law 
Understanding that there is no clear line of demarcation 
between corporate compliance with law and CSR is important in 
many business contexts. I will, however, examine only one 
context that illustrates how corporate governance decisions are 
intertwined with CSR and good citizenship—racial diversity and 
antidiscrimination efforts in the business setting. In this context, 
several problems manifest. First, there is the seemingly 
intractable problem of racially homogenous corporate boards, 
workplaces, and executive ranks.81 And, there are other problems 
that infect relationships between firms and stakeholders of color: 
unfair disparities in pay and promotion rates for employees of 
color when compared to white employees;82 profiling consumers of 
color when they shop; generally inferior service some consumers 
                                                                                                     
 79. Johnson, Corporate Personhood, supra note 2, at 1135. 
 80. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text (arguing that the 
distinction between CSR and corporate governance is blurred). 
 81. See generally, Cheryl L. Wade, Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards: 
How Racial Politics Impedes Progress in the United States, 26 PACE INT’L L. REV. 
23 (2014); Darren Rosenblum, Feminizing Capital: A Corporate Imperative, 6 
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 55 (2010); AARON A. DHIR, CHALLENGING BOARDROOM 
HOMOGENEITY: CORPORATE LAW, GOVERNANCE, AND DIVERSITY (2015). 
 82. See e.g., Cheryl L. Wade, Organizational Responsibility for Workplace 
Racial and Sexual Harassment: The Stories of One Company’s Workers, 43 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 229, 236 (2014) (recounting specific cases against a company 
that had engaged in “workplace racial harassment, retaliatory firings, and pay 
and promotion discrimination”). 
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of color experience;83 and, predatory lending that targets 
consumers of color.84  
Two problems occur when discussing stakeholders of color in 
the business setting. First, emphasis is placed on the race of the 
African American and Latino stakeholders who are negatively 
impacted by business actors while failing to articulate that the 
overwhelming majority of corporate decision-makers are white.85 
This way of discussing relationships among white Americans and 
Americans of color is prevalent.86 It ignores the fact that 
whiteness is a race. I will come back to this later in this Essay 
when I discuss corporate personhood.87 
Second, most discourse about relationships among Americans 
of different races, especially in the business setting, is framed as 
a discussion about diversity.88 Diversity sounds like a CSR 
issue.89 But a lack of diversity in the business setting is simply a 
manifestation of the real problem—implicit, and sometimes even 
explicit, bias and discrimination.90 Once the potential for implicit 
                                                                                                     
 83. See generally George E. Schrer, Saundra Smith & Kristen Thomas, 
“Shopping While Black”: Examining Racial Discrimination in a Retail Setting, 
39 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1432 (2009) (providing empirical evidence of 
inferior service for African American shoppers). 
 84. See generally Cheryl L. Wade, How Predatory Mortgage Lending 
Changed African American Communities and Families, 35 HAMLINE L. REV. 437 
(2012) (looking at the effect of predatory lending on African American 
communities). 
 85. See Jillian Berman, Soon, Not Even 1 Percent of Fortune 500 
Companies Will Have Black CEOs, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 29, 2015 3:41 PM) 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/29/black-ceos-fortune-
500_n_6572074.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2017) (“When McDonald’s CEO Don 
Thompson officially steps down in March, there will be just four black CEOs in 
the Fortune 500.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 86. See Amy H. Kastely, Out of the Whiteness: On Race Codes and White 
Race Consciousness in Some Tort, Criminal, and Contract Law, 63 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 269, 280 (1994) (discussing topics of white race consciousness and the 
“white norm” and their effect on applications of the law). 
 87. See infra notes 190–220 and accompanying text (discussing the racial 
identities of corporations, in particular the existence of “white businesses”). 
 88. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work: Diversity, 
Integration, and Affirmative Action in the Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 1 (2005) (framing discussion in terms of facilitating diversity). 
 89. See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text (defining CSR, including 
social issues). 
 90. See generally IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW (Justin Levinson & 
Robert J. Smith eds., 2012) (describing implicit stereotyping and bias against 
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bias and even explicit discrimination is acknowledged, what is 
typically discussed as a CSR issue—a diversity issue—becomes a 
corporate governance or compliance issue.91 The question 
becomes whether there are effective processes and systems in 
place that measure compliance with antidiscrimination law.92 
This corporate governance question, unlike a CSR/diversity 
question, must be examined because compliance is mandated.93 
The voluntary and discretionary nature of CSR drops out of the 
picture.94 
Here is the problem. Corporate compliance departments 
draft and issue policies about harassment and discrimination.95 
But, too often, the policy is drafted and put on a shelf.96 This is 
inadequate compliance that is also socially irresponsible. 
Moreover, “[m]any compliance metrics track activity rather than 
impact, thereby demonstrating that compliance may be busy but 
not necessarily effective.”97 Though companies might spend 
millions on compliance, busy but ineffective programs are a type 
of check-the-box corporate governance that is not socially 
                                                                                                     
people of color). 
 91. See generally Sharon Rabin-Margalioth, Anti-Discrimination, 
Accommodation, and Universal Mandates: Aren’t They All the Same?, 24 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 111 (2003) (examining the correlation between 
disparate compliance costs and governmental anti-discrimination mandates). 
 92. See LOUIS M. BROWN, ANNE O. KANDEL & RICHARD S. GRUNER, LEGAL 
AUDIT § 8:87 (1990) (evaluating good faith efforts at preventing employment 
discrimination). 
 93. See Sarbanes–Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7202(b) (2012) (making any 
violation of the Act enforceable against the violator). 
 94. See Johnson, Corporate Personhood, supra note 2, at 1135 (“[C]orporate 
responsibility concerns can be seen as picking up precisely where legal 
strictures leave off.”). 
 95. See Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075, 2093 (2016) (“First, authorities uniformly emphasize 
the development of policies and procedures for compliance, tailored to the 
firm.”). 
 96. See Lorene D. Park, The Road to Liability is Paved with Inconsistent 
Enforcement of Grooming, Tipping, and Other Employment Policies, WOLTERS 
KLUWER (Dec. 28, 2013), http://www.employmentlawdaily.com/index.php/ 
2013/12/28/the-road-to-liability-is-paved-with-inconsistent-enforcement-of-grooming- 
tipping-and-many-other-employment-policies/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2017) 
(demonstrating the frequency of non-enforcement of company policy in multiple 
arenas nationwide) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 97. Griffith, supra note 95, at 2105–06. 
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responsible.98 Compliance programs that transform mere activity 
into impact are socially responsible.  
IV. Compliance and Fiduciary Duty 
It is clear that corporate governance failures can have 
significant implications beyond the corporation, its shareholders, 
managers and stakeholders.99 Corporate governance failures can 
have national and even global impact.100 More specifically, 
fiduciary duty breaches and inadequate monitoring of financial 
firms’ compliance with law significantly contributed to the 2008 
financial crisis.101 Corporate actors must take their obligation to 
monitor compliance with law more seriously.102 Boards must 
demand installation and implementation of compliance programs 
but corporate officers perform the day-to-day work of monitoring 
compliance.103 
Chief Compliance Officers and the executives, managers, and 
employees who work for them are on the front line when it comes 
                                                                                                     
 98. See Yanasak & Xenarios, supra note 62 and accompanying text 
(evaluating socially irresponsible “check-the-box” compliance approaches and 
advocating for improvement); Chatterji & Listokin, supra note 60 and 
accompanying text (showing that sometimes even expensive compliance 
programs may not be socially responsible). 
 99. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 48, at 395 (using Enron, WorldCom, 
Adelphia, Qwest, Global Crossing and Tyco as preeminent examples of the 
reaching effects of failure to comply with corporate and other legal 
requirements). 
 100. See id. (citing examples of significant external effects due to corporate 
governance failures). 
 101. See Cheryl L. Wade, Fiduciary Duty and the Public Interest, 91 B.U. L. 
REV. 1191, 1197 (2011) (detailing and examining breaches in fiduciary duty 
involved in the 2008 financial crisis). 
 102. See Claire A. Hill & Brett McDonnell, Reconsidering Board Oversight 
Duties After the Financial Crisis, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 859, 862–63 (2013) 
(asserting that boards must monitor compliance with more fervor in light of the 
2008 financial crisis). 
 103. See generally Megan W. Shaner, The (Un)Enforcement of Corporate 
Officers’ Duties, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 271 (2014) (describing the importance of 
executives and officers in preventing crises by effectively monitoring). See also 
Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, The Domains of Corporate Counsel in an 
Era of Compliance, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 203, 203–06 (2016) (describing differing 
positions on whether corporate counsel, rather than corporate executives, should 
be responsible for monitoring and compliance). 
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to compliance.104 Johnson and Millon’s work about the ambiguity 
of the fiduciary duties that officers owe illuminates potential 
hazards for them. 
For all the renewed federal attention to regulating—and 
differentiating—corporate officer and director functions . . . a 
curious fact remains: state fiduciary duty law makes no 
distinction between the fiduciary duties of these two groups. 
Instead, courts and commentators routinely describe the 
duties of directors and officers together, and in identical terms. 
To lump officers and directors together as generic “fiduciaries”, 
with no distinction being made between them suggests—as 
patently is not the case—that their institutional function and 
legal roles within the corporation are the same.105 
In order to satisfy their fiduciary duties, corporate officers 
are responsible for the details of their firms’ compliance 
programs.106 A great deal is at stake for the executives and 
officers in this regard.107 For example, “officers rightly face a 
greater risk of personal liability for misconduct. Heightened 
review of officer performance is especially fitting given that many 
of the recent corporate scandals involved wrongdoing at the 
officer level.”108 In the compliance context, the officers’ 
misconduct would be one of two things. A grossly negligent 
failure to install an adequate compliance program would breach 
the duty of care that an officer owes.109 A conscious disregard of 
an officer’s obligation to install a compliance program may be 
                                                                                                     
 104. See John B. McNeese IV, The Ethical Conflicts of the Hybrid General 
Counsel and the Chief Compliance Officer, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 677, 683 
(2012) (“Staying in compliance requires an active role on the part of the 
corporation and by extension, the Chief Compliance Officer.”). 
 105. Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers 
Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1601 (2005) [hereinafter Johnson 
& Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers are Fiduciaries] 
 106. See id. (stating that officers “daily manage corporate operations” while 
directors “remotely monitor corporate affairs”). 
 107. See id. at 1602 (“[D]irectors must preserve for themselves a critical 
governance responsibility on behalf of the corporate principal and its 
stockholders . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 108. Id. at 1603. 
 109. The duty of care is breached whenever the decision-making process is 
grossly negligent. See generally Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 
(1st Dept. 1976); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1985). 
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construed as a duty of loyalty breach.110 And, some courts reserve 
business judgment rule protection for directors only.111 In these 
jurisdictions, corporate officers are far more likely to be found to 
have breached fiduciary duties.112 
Moreover, many corporate managers may not get the advice 
they need from in-house corporate counsel concerning the 
fiduciary duties they owe—advice that would help them to 
establish effective compliance programs.113 Johnson and Garvis 
found that more corporate counsel advise executives about their 
fiduciary duties when advising them about compliance and risk 
management issues than in other contexts such as transactional 
work, employee relations, and executive compensation.114 But not 
enough corporate counsel provide advice about fiduciary duty to 
officers and managers who are closer to the middle of corporate 
hierarchies.115 
                                                                                                     
 110. A bad faith failure to monitor compliance with law is established when 
fiduciaries consciously disregard their duties or engage in intentional 
derelictions of their obligations, thereby violating the duty of loyalty. See 
generally Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). 
 111. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business 
Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439, 455–65 (2005) [hereinafter Johnson, Business 
Judgment] (examining business judgment rule protection as used for directors, 
officers generally, or both). 
 112. See id. (examining effects on officer liability depending on a given 
jurisdiction’s treatment of the business judgment rule). 
 113. See Lyman Johnson & Dennis Garvis, Are Corporate Officers Advised 
About Fiduciary Duties?, 64 BUS. LAW. 1105, 1113 (2009) (showing how counsel 
generally advises executives, with less advisory emphasis on mid-level 
managers). 
 114. See id. (finding that advice regarding fiduciary duties is more frequent 
when given to executives about compliance and risk management). 
 115. See id. at 1117 (“[F]ewer than half of all respondents provide fiduciary 
duty advice to managers or officers ‘deeper’ in the organization, such as division 
managers or officers of subsidiaries.”); id. at 1120 (“[C]orporate counsel do not 
appear to do a particularly good job of advising non-senior officers. . . . This is an 
area where advice-giving practices should be improved. It hardly needs arguing 
that executive vice presidents, and the whole gamut of more junior-ranking 
officers beneath them, have enormous influence over corporate affairs.”). For a 
general discussion of fiduciary duties and corporate purpose, see Martin Gelter 
& Genevieve Helleringer, Lift Not the Painted Veil! To Whom Are Directors’ 
Duties Really Owed?, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1069 (2015). 
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V. Corporate Personhood and Purpose 
In the preceding sections of this Essay, I explore the 
possibility of making compliance programs more effective by 
challenging companies that claim to be socially responsible while 
failing to maintain compliance programs that are effectively 
managed and maintained.116 Later in the Essay, I provide context 
for the challenge by looking at how certain companies impact 
stakeholders of color.117 In this section and the sections that 
follow, I examine notions of corporate personhood and purpose, 
some of which are offered by Johnson and Millon, in order to 
present additional inspiration for corporate managers to take 
their compliance obligations more seriously.118 
Relatively uncontroversial is the legal fiction that 
corporations are entities that are separate from the individuals 
who own and manage them.119 There has been some 
disagreement, however, about how to describe and define 
corporate entities in the context of their separateness.120 The 
Supreme Court has refined the notion of corporations as entities 
separate from their shareholders, officers, and directors, making 
it clear that corporations are persons (at least under the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)121 and other federal law) who 
                                                                                                     
 116. See supra notes 43–51, 81–98, 101–115 and accompanying text 
(discussing the overlapping principles guiding CSR and corporate governance, 
viewing this overlap in the context of anti-discrimination and harassment 
compliance regimes, and incorporating this understanding with the doctrine of 
fiduciary duty). 
 117. See infra notes 190–234 and accompanying text (looking at the effect 
companies can have on stakeholders of color by considering the racial 
characteristics of these companies). 
 118. See infra notes 152–200 and accompanying text (examining notions of 
corporate personhood and purpose, including such characteristics as a 
company’s race and religion). 
 119. See Gottlieb v. Kest, 141 Cal. App. 4th 110, 150 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) 
(“Generally, a corporation is a distinct legal entity, separate from its 
shareholders and officers.”). 
 120. See generally Johnson & Millon, After Hobby Lobby, supra note 1 
(highlighting throughout the article points of contention that still exist after the 
Hobby Lobby decision). 
 121. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–2000bb-4 
(2012). 
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are separate from the flesh and blood people who invest in them 
and act on their behalf.122  
In their Article, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby,123 
Johnson and Millon sort through some of the most frequently 
debated issues relating to corporate law and corporate 
governance in the aftermath of the controversial 2014 Supreme 
Court case Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.124 The Supreme 
Court held that for-profit corporations, because they are 
“persons” under RFRA, have a federally protected right to 
exercise religion.125 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Conestoga 
Wood Specialties Corp., the closely held for-profit companies at 
issue in the consolidated cases, argued that the contraceptive 
mandate under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(“ACA”)126 was a substantial burden on the religious freedom of 
the corporations.127 
The Court held that the companies, Hobby Lobby and 
Conestoga, did not have to comply with the ACA’s contraceptive 
mandate because compliance would hamper the companies’ free 
exercise of religion.128 Arguably, the Court protected the 
free-exercise rights of closely held corporations by attributing to 
the corporations the religious beliefs of their Christian 
shareholders.129 The Court acknowledged that its protection of a 
                                                                                                     
 122. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014) 
(“[T]he wor[d] ‘person’ . . . include[s] corporations, companies, associations, 
firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.” 
(citing 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)). 
 123. See Johnson & Millon, After Hobby Lobby, supra note 1, at 2–3 
(discussing the most debated issues arising from the Hobby Lobby decision). 
 124. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 125. See id. at 2771 (affirming the right of for-profit corporations to pursue 
any lawful act or purpose, “including the pursuit of profit in conformity with the 
owners' religious principles.”). 
 126. Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 114-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
 127. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779 (“ . . . [T]he mandate clearly 
imposes a substantial burden on those beliefs.”). 
 128. See id. at 2771 (explaining that for-profit organizations may not be 
presumed to be solely concerned with the pursuit of money). 
 129. See id. at 2768 (“An established body of law specifies the rights and 
obligations of the people (including shareholders, officers, and employees) who 
are associated with a corporation in one way or another. When rights, whether 
constitutional or statutory, are extended to corporations, the purpose is to 
protect the rights of these people.”). 
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closely held for-profit corporation’s free-exercise rights was 
imperative in order to protect the religious freedom of the flesh 
and blood individuals who control and own the corporations.130  
By answering the question of whether a for-profit corporation 
is a person under RFRA in the affirmative, the Court confirmed 
the idea of corporate personhood when it decided the Hobby 
Lobby case.131 Businesspeople, corporate lawyers and scholars, 
along with judges who decide business law cases, long ago 
embraced the notion that corporations are entities separate from 
the humans who own and control them.132 But, knowing that 
corporations are separate from officers, shareholders and 
directors does little to clarify the kinds of entities corporations 
are.133  
Professor Kent Greenfield noted “the increased political focus 
on corporate personhood” after the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,134 in which the 
Court protected the First Amendment rights of corporations to 
make political expenditures aimed at influencing election 
outcomes.135 When Mitt Romney campaigned in 2012, he 
proclaimed that “corporations are people.”136 But, Greenfield 
noted that some notable lawyers, who are politicians also, 
rejected the legal fiction of corporate personhood.137 President 
                                                                                                     
 130. See id. at 2786 (“RFRA is inconsistent with the insistence of an agency 
such as HHS on distinguishing between different religious believers—burdening 
one while accommodating the other—when it may treat both equally by offering 
both of them the same accommodation.”). 
131. See id. at 2768 (Interpreting the RFRA’s use of the term “person” by 
looking to the Dictionary Act, affirming that a corporation is “person” under the 
RFRA (citing Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)). 
 132. See Gottlieb v. Kest, 141 Cal. App. 4th 110, 150 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) 
(“Generally, a corporation is a distinct legal entity, separate from its 
shareholders and officers.”). 
 133. See infra notes 152–200 and accompanying text (examining various 
kinds of corporate identities). 
 134. See 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (affirming and protecting the right of a 
nonprofit corporation to political speech). 
 135. Kent Greenfield, In Defense of Corporate Persons, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 
309, 310 (2015). 
 136. Id. 
 137. See id. (quoting President Barack Obama and Senator Elizabeth 
Warren, whose stances reject the legal fiction of corporate personhood). 
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Obama declared that “people are people.”138 Senator Elizabeth 
Warren made several speeches in which she summarily rejected 
the idea that corporations are persons.139 Greenfield described 
other individuals and organizations that formed what he calls the 
“anti-personhood movement.”140 According to Greenfield, 
however, corporate personhood is an analytically important 
foundational principle that should require “courts to separate the 
claims of shareholders from those of the corporation itself, 
leading to a dismissal of corporate religious claims asserted on 
behalf of shareholders.”141  
Several corporate and criminal law professors, including 
Professor Greenfield, filed an amicus brief exploring the impact 
on corporate law of Hobby Lobby’s and Conestoga’s arguments 
that the religious beliefs of the companies’ shareholders should be 
attributed to the corporations.142 Their argument did not revolve 
around corporate personhood but pertained to the related notion 
of the corporation’s separateness.143 They asserted that 
attributing the religious beliefs of shareholders to the corporation 
in which they invested (whether the investment is direct or 
indirect) ignored the legal fiction of the separateness of the 
corporation from its owners.144 The legal fiction that corporations 
are entities separate from those who own and manage them 
justifies the most salient characteristic of all corporations—
                                                                                                     
 138. Id. 
 139. See id. (“According to the Washington Post, her most dependable 
applause line in her stump speech was “Corporations are not people!”). 
 140. See id. at 310–11 (referencing groups such as Common Cause, Public 
Citizen, and Free Speech for the People as members of the “anti-personhood 
movement”). 
 141. Id. at 312. 
 142. I signed onto an amicus brief drafted by Jayne Barnard, Barbara Black, 
James Cox, Kent Greenfield, Ellen Podgor, and Faith Stevelman that makes 
this point. Amicus Curiae Brief of Corporate and Criminal Law Professors in 
Support of Petitioners, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 
(2014), (Nos. 13-354, 13-356), 2014 WL 333889 (U.S. Jan. 28, 2014) [hereinafter 
Amicus Brief]. 
 143. See generally id. 
 144. See id. at 2 (“The essence of a corporation is its ‘separateness’ from its 
shareholders. It is a distinct legal entity, with its own rights and obligations, 
different from the rights and obligations of its shareholders. This Court has 
repeatedly recognized this separateness.”). 
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limited liability.145 But for this separateness, according to the 
amicus signatories, individual shareholders would be personally 
responsible for the corporation’s tort or contract debts.146 
As we all now know, the Court disagreed with the arguments 
made in the amicus brief, and the Christian faith practiced by the 
shareholders of Hobby Lobby and Conestoga was the religion that 
the companies had a right to freely exercise.147 The Court 
protected the religious freedom of the corporations by referring to 
the religious beliefs of their owners.148 Johnson and Millon, in 
their article Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, explain away the 
concerns of the corporate and criminal law professors who filed 
the amicus brief.149 They point out that the separateness of 
Hobby Lobby and Conestoga from their shareholders was 
preserved because the religious beliefs and practices of the 
individual shareholders are relevant only in their roles as 
corporate actors.150 The article notes, “[a]nalytically, in order to 
preserve the separateness of the corporation as a legal person 
distinct in a meaningful way from the humans associated with it, 
                                                                                                     
 145. When shareholders fail to respect the separation between themselves 
and the corporations in which they invest, courts may pierce the corporate veil 
that protects shareholders with limited liability and the shareholders may be 
held personally liable to tort and contract creditors. See Walkovszky v. Carlton, 
244 N.E.2d 55, 55 (N.Y. 1968) (affirming a denial to dismiss case against 
shareholder defendant because complaint alleged sufficient facts to pierce the 
corporate veil); Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519, 524–25 (7th 
Cir. 1991) (determining that the two-pronged state law test for piercing the 
corporate veil was not satisfied). 
 146. See Amicus Brief, supra note 142, at 2 (“Shareholders rely on the 
corporation's separate existence to shield them from personal liability. When 
they voluntarily choose to incorporate a business, shareholders cannot then 
decide to ignore, either directly or indirectly, the distinct legal existence of the 
corporation when it serves their personal interests.”). 
 147. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014) 
(affirming the lower court judgment that the contraceptive mandate violated 
RFRA). 
 148. See id. at 2768 (“Corporations, ‘separate and apart from’ the human 
beings who own, run, and are employed by them, cannot do anything at all.”). 
 149. See generally Johnson & Millon, After Hobby Lobby, supra note 1, at 16 
(elaborating on the Court’s equating of individual rights with the rights of a 
corporation run by those individuals). 
 150. Id. at 16 (“Roles, organizational structure, and the decisionmaking 
process are all quite different for humans interacting in the corporate setting 
than outside it. But the human desire to express religious convictions in the 
corporate milieu may be no less fervent . . . .”). 
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while still acknowledging their desires for religious expression, 
the Court emphasized . . . the corporate capacity and corporate 
positions and roles played by these humans.”151 
VI. If Corporations Are Persons, What Kinds of Persons Are They? 
Corporations are persons that are separate from the humans 
who own and control them.152 But what kinds of persons are they? 
In the aftermath of the Court’s embrace of and elaboration on 
some aspects of corporate personhood in Hobby Lobby153 and 
Citizens United,154 it is important to dig deep and think about 
other aspects of a corporation’s identity. That is what I do in this 
Part of my Essay, but I do not do so to bestow on corporations 
even more rights. I examine other aspects of a corporation’s 
identity and personhood, specifically a corporation’s race, because 
doing so reveals nontrivial implications for corporate governance 
and social responsibility.155  
Besides the right to freely exercise religion, and their right 
to free speech in the form of political contributions, what else, or 
who else, are corporations? Once we accept the idea that 
corporations are persons who are separate from the flesh and 
blood individuals who own and manage them, it is imperative to 
examine the kinds of persons corporations are.156 Already crystal 
clear are the characteristics of a corporation as an artificial 
entity—limited liability, free transferability of shares, centralized 
                                                                                                     
 151. Id. 
 152. See Gottlieb v. Kest, 141 Cal. App. 4th 110, 150 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) 
(“Generally, a corporation is a distinct legal entity, separate from its 
shareholders and officers.”). 
 153. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 154. Citizens United v. F.E.C., 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 155. See infra notes 157–203, 221–234 and accompanying text (examining 
aspects of corporate identity and personhood for their impact on corporate 
governance and social responsibility). 
 156. For one example exploring this question, see Teemu Ruskola, What is a 
Corporation? Liberal, Confucian, and Socialist Theories of Enterprise 
Organization and State, Family, and Personhood, 37 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 639, 640 
(2014) (“An easy, but not very informative, answer is that [a corporation] is . . . a 
legal person . . . . More substantive answers suggest that it is a moral person, a 
person/thing, a production team, a nexus of private agreements, a city, a 
semi-sovereign, a (secular) God, or a penguin (kind of).”). 
1212 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1187 (2017) 
management, and continuity of life.157 But we need to know more 
about the identity and characteristics of the corporate person. 
This knowledge has important implications that relate to 
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility.158 One 
way to begin this inquiry is to think about how we describe and 
think about flesh and blood people in the United States (U.S.).  
Descriptions of individuals in the U.S. frequently rely on one 
or more of several components of identity: religion; race; gender; 
age; national origin; ethnicity; sexual orientation; class; physical 
ability or disability; and political affiliation, among other 
things.159 Since corporations are persons, it makes sense to ask in 
what ways the factors that make up an individual’s identity apply 
to define and describe the identity of a corporation. 
First, consider two of the factors from the list in the 
preceding paragraph. Flesh and blood people frequently have a 
religious and a political affiliation accompanied by First 
Amendment rights related to these affiliations.160 In some sense, 
so do corporate persons.161 In Hobby Lobby, the U.S. Supreme 
Court protected the free exercise of religion rights of two closely 
held corporations.162 In Citizens United, the Court protected a 
                                                                                                     
 157. See Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the 
Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV. 80, 89 (1991) (“The so-called ‘Kintner regulations,’ 
which govern on this issue, identify four characteristics that distinguish 
corporations and partnerships: continuity of life, centralized management, free 
transferability of interest, and limited liability.”). 
 158. See infra notes 163–178, 212–234 and accompanying text (dealing with 
the elements of corporate personhood—including religion and race—and their 
effect on corporate governance and CSR). 
 159. See, e.g., U.N.C.—GILLINGS SCH. GLOBAL PUB. HEALTH, HOW WOULD 
YOU DEFINE DIVERSITY? 1 (2010), https://sph.unc.edu/files/2013/07/define 
_diversity.pdf (“Differences among groups of people and individuals based on 
ethnicity, race, socioeconomic status, gender, exceptionalities, language, 
religion, sexual orientation, and geographical area.”). 
 160. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”). 
 161. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) 
(affirming the right of religious expression for the corporations); Citizens United 
v. F.E.C., 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (affirming the right to make political 
contributions for the corporation). 
 162. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2751 (allowing closely-held for-profit 
corporations the right to religious expression). 
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corporation’s right to make political expenditures aimed at 
assisting political campaigns.163 So we can say, in some rough 
sense, that corporations (at least those that are closely held) may 
be identified as having religious rights that they can freely 
exercise according to the Court’s reasoning in Hobby Lobby, and 
they also have political affiliations in line with the court’s 
analysis in Citizens United.164 
Two other factors used when describing individuals—age and 
national origin—are far less controversial when used to describe 
corporate persons.165 Some corporations are young, recently 
incorporated startups, others are venerable firms that have been 
incorporated for decades.166 The corporation’s national origin is 
easily defined by looking to the country in which it 
incorporated.167 The analogue to the physical ability of natural 
persons in the corporate context is to ask whether the company is 
performing well.168 Or, is it “disabled” by debt, approaching 
                                                                                                     
 163. See Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310, 313 
(allowing nonprofit corporation the right to make political contributions by 
affirming its right to political speech). 
 164. See id. (identifying a corporation as having political affiliations); Hobby 
Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2751 (discussing corporations and their ability to have 
religious affiliations). 
 165. See How Would You Define Diversity?, supra note 159 (including age 
and national origin in definitions of diversity). 
 166. Compare Biz Carson, Top 17 Startups to Launch So Far in 2016, BUS. 
INSIDER (June 28, 2016, 8:00 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/top-17-
startups-launched-in-2016-2016-6 (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (providing 
examples of “young” companies) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review), with Founded When? America’s Oldest Companies, BUS. NEWS DAILY 
(July 29, 2016, 10:01 AM), http://www.businessnewsdaily.com/8122-oldest-
companies-in-america.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (providing examples of 
“old” companies) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 167. See Richard R. W. Brooks, Incorporating Race, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
2023, 2082 (2006) (“When corporations were largely held by local interests, all 
possessing the same state or national citizenship, the matter of transferring 
shareholder citizenship to the corporation was somewhat straightforward.”). For 
a list of examples of foreign corporations and the countries in which they are 
incorporated, see Foreign Companies Registered and Reporting with the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission December 31, 2000, SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION (Dec. 31, 2000), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/ 
alpha2000.htm (last updated June 25, 2002) (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 168. See Margaret Rouse, Corporate Performance, WHATIS.COM, 
http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/corporate-performance (last updated Oct. 
2015) (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (“Corporate performance analysis is a subset of 
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insolvency or even bankruptcy? The class question is slightly 
more challenging conceptually. For natural persons, class is 
determined by an individual’s wealth, education, social status 
and income.169 Similarly, “class” differences among corporations 
can be examined by looking at a company’s wealth—its assets, for 
example, and its income—more typically referred to as 
earnings.170 
Determining a corporation’s gender, ethnicity, or sexual 
orientation is more problematic analytically but not impossible. A 
closely held company whose shareholders, officers, and directors 
are women or heterosexual may be a female corporation or a 
heterosexual corporation as determined by the identities of its 
shareholders.171 The ethnicity of a closely held corporation may be 
determined by its shareholders when all or most of them are, for 
example, Italian-American.172 The Supreme Court’s approach in 
Hobby Lobby was similar.173 The religious rights of the 
corporation derived from the religious affiliations of Hobby 
Lobby’s owners.174 Arguably, it is possible to label Hobby Lobby 
as a Christian company because its shareholders are Christian.175  
                                                                                                     
business analytics/business intelligence . . . that is concerned with the ‘health’ of 
the organization, which has traditionally been measured in terms of financial 
performance.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 169. See Milton M. Gordon, Social Class in American Sociology, 55 AM. J. 
SOCIOLOGY 262, 262 (1949) (“The term ‘social class’ . . . is used by sociologists to 
refer to the horizontal stratification of a population.”). 
 170. See Wealth, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/w/ 
wealth.asp (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (“Wealth measures the value of all the 
assets of worth owned by a . . . company . . . . Wealth is determined by taking 
the total value of all physical and intangible assets owned, then subtracting all 
debts. Essentially, wealth is the accumulation of resources.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 171. See Brooks, supra note 167, at 2082 (mentioning gender as an element 
of corporate identity based on the shareholders). 
 172. See id. at 2072 (discussing the ethnicity of corporations based on the 
general ethnic identity of the shareholders, though ethnicity of corporations has 
also been found by looking to the conduct of third party consumers). 
 173. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) 
(equating the religious beliefs of the shareholders with the religious affiliation of 
the corporation). 
 174. See id. at 2768 (“Corporations, ‘separate and apart from’ the human 
beings who own, run, and are employed by them, cannot do anything at all.”). 
 175. See id. (making consistent reference to the religion of the Hobby Lobby 
shareholders in order to determine that Hobby Lobby had a protected right to 
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The same reasoning works in determining the race of a 
corporation. The idea that a corporation has a race, however, is 
not new or peculiar.176 While we rarely think of corporate entities 
as female, heterosexual, ethnic, Christian, or Republican, 
corporations have been racialized.177 For example, “courts have 
declared that corporations can and do possess racial identities ‘as 
a matter of law.’”178 
Also, consider that from June 1 through 7, 2016, the first 
“Virtual Black Business Week,” took place.179 There is also a 
“Black Business Directory,”180 a “Black Business Association,181 a 
“National Black Business Month,”182 and even a Black Business 
School.183 Note that these events and organizations do not refer to 
a business week, directory, association or school for “black owned” 
businesses, or for black entrepreneurs.184 They refer to “black 
                                                                                                     
religious expression). 
 176. See Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 
1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that, in the present case, “a corporation has 
acquired an imputed racial identity”). 
 177. See Bains, LLC v. Arco Prod. Co., 405 F.3d 764, 770 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(imputing racial identity to the corporation). 
 178. Brooks, supra note 167, at 2025 (“[C]ourts have declared that 
corporations can and do possess racial identities ‘as a matter of law.’” (citing 
Thinket, 368 F.3d at 1059)). Brooks also cited to Pourier v. S.D. Dep’t of 
Revenue. 658 N.W.2d 395, 404 (finding that corporation had enrolled as a 
member of an Indigenous American ethnic group). 
 179. See NEW YORK BLACK ENTREPRENEURS NETWORK, 
http://www.meetup.com/NewYorkBlackEntrepreneursNetwork/events/22066889
2/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (providing information on upcoming events and for 
those interested in the network) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 180. See BLACKBUSINESSLIST.COM, http://www.blackbusinesslist.com/ (last 
visited Apr. 19, 2017) (providing links to support, advertise, or search for black 
businesses) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 181. See BLACK BUSINESS ASSOCIATION, http://www.bbala.org/ (last visited 
Apr. 19, 2017) (providing links to bids, jobs, events, news, and other member 
information) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 182. See BLACKBUSINESSMONTH.COM, http://blackbusinessmonth.com/ (last 
visited Apr. 19, 2017) (providing links in a timeline highlighting notable news in 
the black business community) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 183. See THE BLACK BUSINESS SCHOOL, http://theblackbusinessschool.com/ 
(last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (providing information for enrolling in the school and 
the featured programs in the curriculum) (on file with Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 184. See supra notes 179–183 (choosing to explicitly describe and attribute 
race to the organizations’ identity). 
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business.”185 There are also Hispanic Business Associations186 
and a National Hispanic Business Group.187 And, there is an 
Asian American Business Association188 and an Asian American 
Business Roundtable.189 
The fact that there are categories labeled “black business,”190 
“Hispanic business,”191 and Asian American business192 not only 
illustrates the racialization of business and firms, but also begs 
the question of whether there is such a thing as “white 
business.”193 There do not seem to be any white business schools, 
national white business months, white business associations or 
directories.194 But the fact that there are no explicitly labeled 
                                                                                                     
 185. See supra notes 179–183 (referring to the businesses as “black” rather 
than describing the business in reference to its black members). 
 186. See, e.g., ROCHESTER HISPANIC BUSINESS ASSOCIATION, 
http://rochesterhba.org/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (providing links to bids, jobs, 
events, news, and other member information) (on file with Washington and Lee 
Law Review); see also HISPANIC BUSINESS ASSOCIATION, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 
BUSINESS SCHOOL, http://www.cbshba.com/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (providing 
links and general information for members, recruiters, prospective students) (on 
file with Washington and Lee Law Review).   
 187. See NATIONAL HISPANIC BUSINESS GROUP, http://www.nhbg.org/ (last 
visited Apr. 19, 2017) (providing links to events, funding, and other member 
information) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 188. See ASIAN AMERICAN BUSINESS EXPO, http://asianamerican  
businessexpo.com/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (providing links for the event 
program, registration, membership, and sponsorship opportunities) (on file with 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 189. See ASIAN AMERICAN BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, 
http://aabusinessroundtable.org/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (providing 
information on the forum, the AABR generally, upcoming summits, speaker 
information, and registration) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 190. See supra notes 179–183 (illustrating groups organizing around the 
concept of “black business”). 
 191. See supra notes 186–187 (noting groups organizing around the concept 
of “Hispanic business”).  
 192. See supra notes 188–189 (identifying groups organizing themselves 
around the concept of Asia American business). 
 193. See Alicia M. Robb & Robert W. Fairlie, Access to Financial Capital 
Among U.S. Businesses: The Case of African American Firms, 613 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 47, 48–49 (2007) (discussing the negative impact of 
limited access to financial capital on African American businesses). 
 194. See generally ALICIA M. ROBB & ROBERT W. FAIRLIE, RACE AND 
ENTREPRENEURIAL SUCCESS: BLACK-, ASIAN-, AND WHITE-OWNED BUSINESSES IN 
THE UNITED STATES (2008) (referring to “white-owned” businesses rather than 
describing business identities as “white”). 
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white business schools, directories, organizations, or events, does 
not mean that they do not exist.195 We just do not speak of them 
in that way. To do so would be deemed by some as racist.196  
If there are in fact black, Asian American, and Latino 
businesses, it would seem that the rest of U.S. businesses are 
white.197 The fact that they are not labeled white is irrelevant.198 
They exist. They are companies where the overwhelming 
majority, if not all, board members, executives, or senior 
managers are white.199 Corporate persons belong to socially 
constructed racial groups in ways that are similar to the 
assignation of race to flesh and blood persons.200 Acknowledging 
and understanding this will help corporate officers and managers 
navigate their relationships with stakeholders of color.201  
In examining the utility of racializing the corporate person,202 
it is important to understand what race is.203 Critical legal 
                                                                                                     
 195. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 915 (1982) 
(directly identifying the existence of “white businesses”). 
 196. See The Racial Equity Resource Guide, W.K. KELLOGG FOUNDATION, 
http://www.racialequityresourceguide.org/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) 
(identifying certain networks and programs aimed at building anti-racist 
coalitions against “white” organizations) (on file with Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 197. See supra notes 179–189 (providing examples of black, Hispanic, and 
Asian American “business” groups). 
 198. See supra note 194 (labeling businesses as white-owned rather than 
truly being white businesses). 
 199. White-owned businesses that are run exclusively by white management 
embody a “white business” identity even if they are not described, by themselves 
and others, as such. See supra note 194, at 1 (discussing the disparities between 
businesses owned by individuals of different races). 
 200. See Bernie D. Jones, Fathers of Conscience: Mixed-Race Inheritance in 
the Antebellum South, 52 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 395, 395 (2010) (noting that 
“[c]ategorical assignations of race and status fail to encompass a lateral 
diversity to include free, wealthy, and propertied blacks”). 
 201. See Sloan T. Letman & Katherine Leslie, Disproportionate Minority 
Confinement, 2004 J. INST. JUST. INT’L STUD. 57, 70 (utilizing advisory groups 
including “stakeholders of color” to effectively respond to community problems, 
which is a tactic for corporate relations with stakeholders of color as well). 
 202. See John A. Powell & Caitlin Watt, Corporate Prerogative, Race, and 
Identity under the Fourteenth Amendment, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 885, 899 (2010) 
(discussing the racialization of the corporate person) (citing Steve Martinot, The 
Cultural Roots of Interventionism in the United States, 30 SOC. JUST. 1, 126 
(2003)). 
 203. See Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis Coll., 784 F.2d 505, 517 (3d Cir. 1986) 
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scholars explain that race is a social construct.204 Ian F. Haney 
Lopez explained that, “human interaction rather than natural 
differentiation must be seen as the source and continued basis for 
racial categorization.”205 He also noted that, “races are construed 
relationally, against one another, rather than in isolation.”206  
Another commenter observed that “[p]ersons of different 
races have distinguishing physical characteristics. These physical 
characteristics, such as phenotype, are, however, not biologically 
determinative of personality, traits, intelligence, or other 
important personal characteristics.207 In fact, the biological 
difference is unimportant, but society has constructed important 
differences.”208 Race is a social construction, but it is “materially 
relevant.”209 
Psychologists observe that the assignation of race to 
individuals in the U.S. is inevitable.210 Phenotype and other 
                                                                                                     
(noting the difficulty some courts have faced in defining what race is). 
 204. See supra notes 205–219 (describing various interpretations of race as a 
social construct and its effects on the corporate person). 
 205. See Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some 
Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 
27 (1994) (arguing for viewing race as a social construction). 
 206. See id. at 28 (discussing the “four important facets of the social 
construction of race”). 
 207. See Ann C. McGinley, Policing and the Clash of Masculinities, 59 HOW. 
L.J. 221, 241 (2015) (discussing critical race theory and race as a social 
construction); see also Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609 
(1987) (finding that only in the twentieth century did dictionaries refer to “race 
as involving divisions of mankind based upon different physical 
characteristics”). 
 208. See id. at 241 (noting that “history and its social effects” created race). 
 209. See id. (arguing that it is “materially relevant” because “blackness” and 
its association with stereotypes and prejudices affect society, institutions, and 
the individuals within them). 
 210.  
Race essentializes and stereotypes people, their social statuses, their 
social behaviors and their social ranking. In the Unites States and 
South Africa, one cannot escape the process of racialization; it is a 
basic element of the social system and customs of the United States 
and is deeply embedded in the consciousness of its people. Physical 
traits have been transformed into markers or signifiers of social 
racial identity. But the flexibility of racial ideology is such that 
distinctive physical traits need no longer be present for humans to 
racialize others. 
Audrey Smedley & Brian D. Smedley, Race as Biology Is Fiction, Racism as a 
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physical attributes are less relevant than the cultural meanings 
that attach to an individual’s race.211 The notion of corporate 
personhood invites the same type of racialization of firms that 
occurs with individuals, but this racialization does not depend on 
physical characteristics.212 I posit that it does not even depend on 
a physical body, thereby making a corporation’s racialization less 
implausible. In other words, the corporation has no physical body 
but it can still have a race.213  
I acknowledge, however, that racializing corporations may 
unfairly advantage or disadvantage corporations depending on 
the race attributed to them.214 The race of flesh and blood persons 
“continues to play an important role in determining how 
individuals are treated . . . their employment opportunities . . . 
and whether individuals can fully participate in the social, 
political, and economic mainstream of American life.”215 The same 
thing can happen when considering the race of a corporation.216 
                                                                                                     
Social Problem Is Real: Anthropological and Historical Perspectives on the 
Social Construction of Race, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 16, 22 (2005). 
211.  
Skin color, hair texture, nose width, and lip thickness have remained 
major markers of racial identity in the United States. . . . However, 
physical features and differences connoted by them are not the 
effective or direct causes of racism and discrimination. It is the 
culturally invented ideas and beliefs about these differences that 
constitute the meaning of race. 
Id. at 20. 
 212. See Vinay Harpalani, DesiCrit: Theorizing the Racial Ambiguity of 
South Asian Americans, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 77, 170 (2013) (referencing 
the idea that “[b]y making race—taking an active part in the process if 
racialization—individuals stake out new racial meanings”); see also STEVE 
MARTINOT, THE RULE OF RACIALIZATION: CLASS, IDENTITY, GOVERNANCE 75 (2003) 
(noting that physical characteristics serve as signifiers and play a role in 
racialization). 
 213. See Robert E. Suggs, Racial Discrimination in Business Transactions, 
42 HASTINGS L.J. 1257, 1288 n.165 (1991) (describing how the Supreme Court 
implicitly “recognized that corporations can have a race”). 
 214. See supra note 211, at 16, 23 (finding that public policy cannot ignore 
race). 
 215. Id. at 23. See also Paul Gowder, Symposium: Critical Race Theory and 
Empirical Methods Conference: Critical Race Science and Critical Race 
Philosophy of Science, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3155, 3157 (2015) (“When 
we . . . observe the race of others, that observation is not a neutral act.”). 
 216. See supra note 207 (describing how one’s race affects their social and 
economic status as individuals, but without precluding that description for the 
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Attributing race to a place or thing other than an individual 
is not new.217 Scholars have written about racialized spaces—
white neighborhoods, schools, workplaces, and restaurants, for 
example.218 These “white spaces” contrast with what many 
Americans stereotypically construe as “black spaces.” The ghetto 
as a black space is one example.219 This phenomena, “[t]he 
‘racialization of space,’ . . . is the process by which residential 
location and community are carried and placed on racial 
identity.”220 
John Calmore noted that “legal persons adopt and are 
ascribed identities for the same reasons as natural persons: 
Identities signify commitments of persons to other persons, 
communities, beliefs, and conventions.”221 When a company 
acknowledges its racial identity, it has the capacity to understand 
more clearly certain governance issues.222 To which stakeholders 
is the corporation committed? What is the company’s relationship 
with stakeholders of color? If this relationship is not optimal, 
acknowledging a company’s racial identity may reveal implicit 
biases and perhaps even previously ignored intentional 
discrimination.223 A focus on a corporation’s race can inform a 
company’s compliance with anti-discrimination law—an 
important corporate governance matter.224 And, when business 
                                                                                                     
race of corporations as well). 
 217. See supra notes 205–212 (noting examples of attributing race to 
something other than an individual). 
 218. See Elijah Anderson, The White Space, in SOCIOLOGY OF RACE AND 
ETHNICITY 10, 10 (2015) (noting the clear differences between “white” and 
“black” spaces). 
 219. Id. 
 220. See John O. Calmore, Racialized Space and the Culture of Segregation: 
“Hewing a Stone of Home From a Mountain of Despair”, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1233, 
1235 (1995) (defining the “racialization of space” concept). 
 221. Id. at 2026. 
 222. See Powell & Watt, supra note 202, at 897 (recognizing that the 
“deliberate creation of a space for both a new kind of racial identity and a new 
kind of citizen that would implicate the role and identity with the elite and 
corporate America”). 
 223. See Stephanie Bornstein, Unifying Antidiscrimination Law Through 
Stereotype Theory, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 919, 926 (2016) (noting the use of 
“implicit bias to broaden the concept of intentional discrimination” when 
challenging “subtle discrimination”). 
 224. See Cheryl L. Wade, Racial Discrimination and the Relationship 
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leaders no longer ignore their firm’s racial identity, their firms’ 
relationships with stakeholders of color may improve.225 When 
corporate leaders understand racial differences between their 
firms and the firms’ stakeholders, implicit biases that 
disadvantage certain stakeholders may become more 
discoverable.226 The impact of better relationships with 
stakeholders of color can have at least modestly transformative 
consequences for American society in general.227 The ubiquity and 
influence of corporations in U.S. culture may mean that more 
equitable corporate cultures will positively influence racial reality 
in the U.S.228 
Understanding a firm’s racial identity has potentially 
positive implications that may make the company more socially 
responsible.229 Take for example the corporation that has hired 
                                                                                                     
Between the Directorial Duty of Care and Corporate Disclosure, 63 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 389, 389–90 (2002) (stating that breaches of antidiscrimination monitoring 
compliance can seriously harm the economic interests of shareholders in the 
short term and may also affect the long term profitability of the corporation and 
shareholders). 
 225. See id. at 440 (suggesting “ways to help corporate managers serve 
shareholders” and other stakeholders “while adhering to . . . the laws 
prohibiting racial discrimination”). 
 226. See Elayne E. Greenberg, Fitting the Forum to the Pernicious Fuss: A 
Dispute System Design to Address Implicit Bias and ‘Isms in the Workplace, 17 
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 75, 76 (2015) (finding that “although overt 
expressions of bias have significantly decreased in recent years, expressions of 
implicit bias, the primary cause of workplace discrimination, persist”). 
 227. See Jeff Nesbit, America Has a Big Race Problem, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP. (March 28, 2016), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-03-
28/america-has-a-big-race-problem (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (finding that 
there is a need for younger generations misperceptions about a “post-racial 
society” in the corporate world to change) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 228. See LEADERSHIP LEARNING CMTY., LEADERSHIP & RACE 10 (2010), 
http://leadershiplearning.org/system/files/Leadership%20and%20Race%20FINA
L_Electronic_072010.pdf (discussing whether current approaches contribute to 
“growing disparities” or supporting “a more equitable and just future for people 
of all races and ethnicities”). 
 229. See RONDA L. WHITE, THE ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
ENDORSEMENT WITH RACE-RELATED EXPERIENCES, RACIAL ATTITUDES, AND 
PSYCHOLOGICAL OUTCOMES AMONG BLACK COLLEGE STUDENTS ii, xiv (2008) 
(noting that these findings suggest that endorsement of social responsibility 
attitudes differs from actual engagement in the behaviors consistent with social 
responsibility) (on file with the DeepBlue Collection at the University of 
Michigan). 
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few people of color. If that firm’s managers acknowledge the 
firm’s race as white, they may become more cognizant of the 
impact of racial differences between the firm and its decision 
makers on the one hand, and the people of color interviewed on 
the other.230 Or, if most of the interviewees are white, and if most 
are hired to the exclusion of candidates of color, the shared racial 
identity of the white firm and the white hires may inspire 
meaningful introspection about hiring practices.231 
Attributing racial identity to a corporation may shed light on 
the pervasive, entrenched ways race and racism impact a 
company’s relationship with stakeholders of color, its culture, and 
its social standing.232 Lawyers, academics, judges, and 
businesspeople rarely talk about race in the context of corporate 
law and governance.233 The fact that little to nothing is said about 
race in the corporate context, however, does not render race, 
racism, and racial difference unimportant or nonexistent. 
Scholars have noted that, “[r]ace suffuses all bodies of 
law . . . even ‘the purest corporate law questions within the most 
unquestionably Anglo scholarly paradigm.’”234  
                                                                                                     
 230. See Dr. Arin N. Reeves, Colored by Race: Bias in the Evaluation of 
Candidates of Color by Law Firm Hiring Committees, MINORITY CORP. COUNSEL 
ASS’N (2006), http://www.mcca.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.viewpage& 
pageid=576 (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (discussing “strategies law firms should 
employ to address the challenges they face in creating and implementing an 
objective hiring process where differences are valued instead of tolerated and 
diversity is appreciated instead of exploited”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 231. See id. (outlining specific hiring processes that “acknowledge the 
realities of racial bias” which “cannot be removed unless” it is acknowledged).   
 232. See CHARLES T. BANNER-HALEY, THE FRUITS OF INTEGRATION: BLACK 
MIDDLE-CLASS IDEOLOGY AND CULTURE, 1960–1990, 161 (2010) (noting that 
African Americans continued “to face a corporate culture entrenched in racist 
notions” about African Americans). 
 233. See Cheryl L. Wade, Corporate Social Responsibility: Empathy and 
Race Discrimination, 76 TULANE L. REV. 1461, 1461–62 (2002) (finding that 
books on corporate governance are silent on race issues and citing Jay W. Lorsch 
& Elizabeth MacIver, Pawns or Potentates (1989) and Robert A.G. Monks & Nell 
Minow, Corporate Governance (2d ed. 2001) as examples of this idea). 
 234. See Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some 
Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 
44 (1994) (discussing the idea that “no body of law exists untainted by the 
powerful astringent of race in our society”) (citing Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural 
Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705, 
729 and Mario L. Baeza, Telecommunications Reregulation and Deregulation: 
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VII. Johnson and Millon on Hobby Lobby: Shareholder Primacy, 
Stakeholders, and Corporate Social Responsibility 
The Court in Hobby Lobby makes clear that a corporation’s 
role and purpose is not limited to shareholder wealth 
maximization.235 Under state law, the Court explains, for-profit 
corporations may be formed to pursue any lawful purpose their 
organizers desire.236 Corporations may pursue profit, for example, 
“in conformity with the owners’ religious principles.”237 The Court 
acknowledges that the goal of for-profit corporations is to “pursue 
profit” but they do not have to do so “at the expense of everything 
else.”238 Offering two examples, the Court explains that many 
for-profit corporations behave charitably and altruistically.239 
Some firms protect the environment in ways that go beyond what 
is required by law.240 Other companies may operate in ways that 
protect workers’ interests beyond “the requirements of local law 
regarding working conditions and benefits.”241 
The Court’s language, perhaps unwittingly, suggests 
important analytical distinctions among the notions of corporate 
compliance, stakeholder theory, and corporate social 
                                                                                                     
The Impact on Opportunities for Minorities, 2 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 7 (1985) 
(discussing the pervasive impact of race on society)). 
 235. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014) 
(noting that modern corporate law may not require corporations to “pursue 
profit at the expense of everything else”). 
 236. Id. at 2771. 
 237. See id. at 2770–71 (finding that state law, which governs the “objectives 
that may” be pursued by companies, permits religious principles to guide profit 
pursuits for the companies at issue in the case). 
 238. See id. at 2771 (permitting invocation of religious principles for 
company goals and objectives). 
 239. See id. (illustrating through examples of a “for-profit corporation 
[taking] costly pollution-control and energy-conservation measures that go 
beyond what the law requires” and “a for-profit corporation that operates 
facilities in other countries [that] may exceed the requirements of local law 
regarding working conditions and benefits”). 
 240. See id. (using a hypothetical example to show that U.S. companies may 
unilaterally behave altruistically when they provide advantages and benefits 
beyond what is required overseas, and thus, not succumbing to the low-hanging 
profitable fruit of engaging in inhumane, but legal working conditions abroad). 
 241. See id. (describing how there is no reason religious objectives may not 
be pursued). 
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responsibility.242 That corporate boards and officers should install 
monitoring systems that produce information about their firms’ 
compliance with applicable law is a foundational corporate 
governance principle.243 The Court introduces this idea by 
referring to what the law requires companies to do to protect the 
environment or workers.244 
Then, the Court acknowledges that state corporate 
statutes permit for-profit companies to go beyond what the law 
requires in environmental regulation and labor law.245 This 
going beyond what the law requires can be construed as the 
application of stakeholder theory.246 This is the idea that, in 
their decision-making, boards may consider the interests of any 
constituency that has a stake in the company—employees, 
creditors, consumers, and the communities in which the 
company does business.247 So, corporate boards can do more 
than what the law requires for the benefit of the company’s 
stakeholders.248 For example, as the Court states in Hobby 
                                                                                                     
 242. See id. (leaving open the implications of corporations adopting 
charitable or altruistic objectives). 
 243. See In re Caremark Intern. Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 
(Del. Ch. 1996) (describing failure to monitor as “director inattention or 
‘negligence’”). 
 244. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014) 
(noting how both Pennsylvania and Oklahoma law permit pursuit of profits “in 
conformance with the owners’ religious principles”). 
 245. See id. (noting how both Pennsylvania and Oklahoma law permit 
pursuit of profits “in conformance with the owners’ religious principles”). 
 246. See Benedict Sheehy, Scrooge—The Reluctant Stakeholder: Theoretical 
Problems in the Shareholder-Stakeholder Debate, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 193, 
201 (2005) (describing stakeholder theory as embodying “the idea that the 
corporation is an entity that has profound effects on society. On that basis, those 
affected should have some influence or control over the corporation”). 
 247. See Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the 
Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, And Implications, 20 ACADEMY MGMT. REV. 65, 
82 (1995), http://faculty.wwu.edu/dunnc3/rprnts.stakeholdertheoryofcorporation. 
pdf (noting that the “modern corporation by its nature creates interdependencies 
with a variety of groups with whom the corporation has a legitimate concern, 
such as employees, customers, suppliers and members of the communities in 
which the corporation operates”).  
 248. See Noah Noked, The Corporate Social Responsibility Report and 
Effective Stakeholder Engagement, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE 
& FIN. REG. (Dec. 28, 2013), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/12/28/the-
corporate-social-responsibility-report-and-effective-stakeholder-engagement/ (last 
visited Apr. 19, 2017) (concluding that “it would benefit companies to effectively 
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Lobby, boards can adopt “costly pollution-control . . . measures 
that go beyond what the law requires.”249 These 
pollution-control measures protect corporate stakeholders, 
namely, local communities.250 The Court also acknowledges 
that state law allows many for-profit companies to operate 
“facilities in other countries [that] may exceed the 
requirements of local law regarding working conditions and 
benefits.”251 Once again, this is relevant to stakeholder 
theory.252 Some companies protect stakeholders, i.e. workers, in 
other countries even when not required to do so under domestic 
and foreign law.253 
But the Court seems to go beyond stakeholder theory when 
it mentions that there is nothing in state corporation statutes 
precluding charitable, humanitarian, and altruistic goals.254 
The Court points out that some corporations adopt 
“energy-conservation measures” that are not required by 
law.255 Conserving energy is a practice that goes beyond the 
interests of a company’s stakeholders.256 It benefits national 
                                                                                                     
engage their shareholders, and other stakeholders as necessary . . . so that 
(1) related stakeholder concerns can be proactively discussed and 
addressed . . . [and] (3) relationships between companies and their stakeholders 
may be nurtured.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 249. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771 (comparing pursuit of religious 
objectives with pollution-control and energy-conservation measures). 
 250. See id. at 2771 (implying that these environmental concerns constitute 
“worthy objectives” precisely because they protect local communities as 
corporate stakeholders). 
 251. See id. (noting other objectives that are as worthy and permissible as 
pursuing religious objectives). 
 252. See Sheehy, supra note 246 (noting a corporation’s fundamental 
tendency to affect society). 
 253. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014) 
(referencing the example of a company adhering to working conditions and 
benefits in excess of those required by the law to protect stakeholder-workers). 
 254. See id. (finding that Pennsylvania and Oklahoma laws permit for-profit 
corporations to pursue “any lawful purpose” or “act,” including the pursuit of 
profit in conformity with the owners’ religious principles and that corporate 
discretion in this regard is broad). 
 255. See supra note 249 and accompanying text (using the example of 
corporations pursuing far-reaching environmental objectives to illustrate 
permissible, worthy objectives for corporations beyond sheer profit 
maximization). 
 256. See supra note 250 (recognizing energy and pollution-conservation 
measures as benefitting company stakeholders in the form of local 
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and global communities.257 It is corporate social 
responsibility.258 
This part of the Court’s analysis in Hobby Lobby can assist 
corporate leaders in managing their firms’ anti-discrimination 
efforts and articulated diversity goals.259 When it comes to 
compliance with anti-discrimination law, business leaders must 
be clear about what the law requires, and they must be clear and 
honest about explicit and implicit biases at their firms.260 In this 
regard, the assignation of race to a corporation, discussed earlier 
in this Essay, is helpful.261 Many, if not most, white Americans 
enjoy the privilege of not having to think about race and racism 
as often as Americans of color do.262 Understandably, white 
Americans may not notice implicit and even explicit acts or 
patterns of racial bias because it does not impact them.263 The 
same is true for corporate managers.264 As white Americans, they 
                                                                                                     
communities). 
 257. See Corporate Environmental Responsibility, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. 
UNITED NATIONS, http://www.fao.org/corporate-environmental-responsibility/en/ 
(last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (identifying companies that adopt a “global citizen” 
mindset and adopt energy and pollution-conservation measures that in turn 
have led to “the implementation of top-down internal policies which put word to 
actions as well as encouraging internal grassroots movements.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 258. See Danny Wilson, Corporate Environmental Responsibility, HARV. POL. 
REV. (Oct. 4, 2010), http://harvardpolitics.com/online/hprgument-blog/corporate-
environmental-responsibility/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (discussing the “recent 
expansion of corporate social responsibility to include environmental issues”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 259. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014) 
(opening up corporate potential to pursue worthy corporate goals related to 
race). 
 260. See Greenberg, supra note 226, at 76 (discussing the biases pervasive in 
corporations and corporate culture generally). 
 261. See Smedley & Smedley, supra note 210 (discussing the implications of 
the “assignation of race”). 
 262. See Antony Page, Batson’s Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and 
the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 185 (2005) (identifying the reality 
of unconscious bias, but the different cognitions of race experienced by African 
Americans and whites). 
 263. See id. at 184 (describing the “modern racists” who may “genuinely” not 
believe themselves to be racist). 
 264. See Greenberg, supra note 226, at 76 (noting the role corporate leaders 
can and should take on in grappling with their own racial biases and those 
existing at their companies). 
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may not pick up on or understand systemic racism that taints 
hiring, promotion and pay practices, and relationships with 
consumers and communities of color.265 The attribution of race, or 
more particularly whiteness, to the corporation may inspire 
deeper thought regarding race and racism within firms.266 When 
white executives and managers understand that they are working 
for a white firm, the racial differences between the corporation on 
the one hand, and stakeholders of color on the other, may clarify 
the racial realities within corporate cultures for business 
leaders.267 This will help them to more adequately monitor 
compliance with anti-discrimination law.268  
But corporate leaders infrequently discuss or think about 
race discrimination.269 Most corporate discourse, thought or 
disclosure about people of color focuses on diversity—racial 
diversity among employees,270 or ways to convince consumers of 
color to do business with a firm.271 This is stakeholder theory in 
action.272 Unfortunately, however, considering the number of race 
discrimination claims brought by workers and evidence of 
                                                                                                     
 265. See Reeves, supra note 230 (illustrating a corporate hiring process 
tainted by systemic racism).   
 266. See Page, supra note 262, at 185 (discussing the need to unravel or 
wind back biases through identifying as a white business and by doing so make 
corporate managers cognizant and more responsive to stakeholders of color). 
 267. See Cheryl L. Wade, “We Are an Equal Opportunity Employer”: 
Diversity Doublespeak, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1541, 1582 (2004) (finding that 
management understanding racial realities through identifying themselves as a 
white corporation has been insufficient to resolve persistent discriminatory 
corporate culture).   
 268. See Wade, supra note 224, at 389 (discussing the implications of 
complying with antidiscrimination monitoring as an immense net gain for a 
corporation).   
 269. See Page, supra note 262, at 185 (recognizing an “unconsciousness” 
with respect to race).   
 270. See Wade, supra note 267, at 1582 (explaining that companies say that 
diversity is a priority even while failing to confront persisting discrimination).   
 271. See Roy S. Ginsburg, Diversity Makes Cents: The Business Case for 
Diversity, 2014 A.B.A SECTION ANNUAL CONFERENCE SECTION OF LITIG. (2014), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/material
s/2014_sac/2014_sac/diversity_makes_cents.authcheckdam.pdf (introducing a 
focus on diversity as an avenue for business expansion and development).  
 272. See Sheehy, supra note 246, at 201 (describing a corporation’s effects on 
society and the need for those affected in society, by a corporate diversity focus, 
to have an influence and voice in corporate action). 
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discrimination against consumers, companies do not seem to do 
as well as they claim when it comes to compliance with 
anti-discrimination law (a corporate governance issue).273 The 
lack of racial diversity among employees, and the impact of 
discriminatory practices that negatively impact consumers, 
indicates a lack of corporate compliance with anti-discrimination 
law and a failure to consider stakeholder interests.274 
After Hobby Lobby, it is clear that for-profit corporations may 
pursue socially responsible goals (however defined) while they 
pursue profits.275 The resistance to corporate social responsibility 
has typically revolved around the idea that such efforts would 
run contrary to the goal of shareholder wealth maximization.276 
Hobby Lobby, however, makes clear the fact that profit 
maximization is not synonymous with corporate purpose.277 
For-profits may pursue any lawful purpose or business,278 and 
may even pursue socially responsible goals that reduce 
shareholder wealth.279 This makes obsolete the debate about 
whether a business case for diversity can be articulated. A 
                                                                                                     
 273. See Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2016, U.S. EQUAL EMP. 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges. 
cfm (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (noting that 31,027 race discrimination 
employment claims were filed in fiscal year 2015) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 274. See Wade, supra note 267, at 1582 (identifying the failure to follow 
through on prioritizing diversity and rooting out racial discrimination is 
indicative of a failure to consider stakeholder, and by extension society’s 
interests). 
 275. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014) 
(finding that pursuit of environmental and religious objectives is fully allowable 
under the law). 
 276. See Dodge v. Ford, for the leading decision which has been interpreted 
to support the long-standing notion that corporations should be run in a manner 
that maximizes shareholder wealth and profits. 170 N.W. 668, 682 (Mich. 1919). 
 277. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771 (concluding that pursuit of 
religious objectives may take precedence should owners so desire). 
 278. See id. (referencing modern corporate law’s tenet that “each American 
jurisdiction today either expressly or by implication authorizes corporations to 
be formed under its general corporation act for any lawful purpose or business”) 
(citing 1 J. COX & T. HAZEN, TREATISE OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 4:1, at 224 
(3d ed. 2010)). 
 279. See id. (discussing the aforementioned environmental and working 
conditions objectives and their permissibility notwithstanding any adverse 
impact such objectives may have on shareholder wealth). 
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business case for diversity is no longer needed.280 After Hobby 
Lobby, for-profits are freer to think more deeply about the 
seemingly intractable problems of racial inequities within their 
firms and problematic relationships between their firms and 
stakeholders of color.281 
VIII. Context 
In this Part, I provide context for the preceding discussion. I 
describe predatory lending by firms that victimized Americans of 
color.282 Of course, the predatory lenders were subject to 
mandates to comply with anti-discrimination law.283 It is hard to 
imagine why compliance programs did not reveal pervasive race 
discrimination at the firms involved.284 My discussion in this Part 
supports the idea that a more frank discussion about racial 
difference and discrimination—both implicit and explicit—can 
lead to more effective compliance.285 Acknowledging that the 
                                                                                                     
 280. See Dorie Clark, Making the Business Case for Diversity, FORBES (Aug. 
21, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/dorieclark/2014/08/21/making-
the-business-case-for-diversity/#5a85b37919b3 (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) 
(adopting the idea that a business case for diversity is necessary before 
corporate management will prioritize it) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 281. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014) 
(noting that the pursuit of objectives other than profit maximization permits 
corporate decision-makers to set their corporate agenda for “worthy” objectives). 
 282. See Creola Johnson, The Magic of Group Identity: How Predatory 
Lenders Use Minorities to target Communities of Color, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. 
& POL'Y 165, 170 (2010) (describing targeted marketing of minorities by 
predatory lenders); see also WEI LI ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, 
PREDATORY PROFILING: THE ROLE OF RACE AND ETHNICITY IN THE LOCATION OF 
PAYDAY LENDERS IN CALIFORNIA 2 (2009), http://www.responsiblelending.org/ 
california/ca-payday/research-analysis/predatory-profiling.pdf (noting in its 
report that African Americans and Latinos make up a disproportionate share of 
payday loan borrowers). 
 283. See id. at 199 (recognizing that liability may arise under 
antidiscrimination laws for practices that predatory lenders may otherwise 
claim as effective marketing strategies). This idea was noted by the court in 
Hargraves v. Capital City Mortgage Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 7, 22 (D.D.C. 2000).   
 284. See Wade, supra note 224, at 390 (noting the economic consequences of 
non-compliance, but questioning why racial discrimination’s extensiveness did 
not raise red flags). 
 285. See id. (supporting the need for a new approach to incentivize corporate 
compliance with antidiscrimination law). 
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overwhelming majority of the firms that engaged in predatory 
lending were “white” firms (i.e., explicitly racializing them), and 
acknowledging that the firms’ victims were people of color are 
important steps toward accomplishing this.286 
Banks and other financial institutions targeted people of 
color—African Americans in particular—for high-interest 
predatory mortgages.287 Studies have found that “[m]ortgage 
originators relaxed their standards to offer subprime mortgages, 
and in some instances, engaged in fraud so that they could lend 
money at high rates of interest and therefore make more 
money.”288 Many consumers of color who qualified for prime or 
low-interest mortgages were offered only subprime, high-interest 
loans.289 Some consumers of color who did not qualify for 
                                                                                                     
 286. See Powell & Watt, supra note 202, at 899 (discussing the positive 
consequences that would flow from racializing corporations). 
 287. See Wade, supra note 84, at 447 (arguing that “[r]eforming the 
secondary mortgage market will be futile” unless the underlying unfair 
treatment of minorities before the 2008 crisis is tackled head on). For example, a 
former Wells Fargo credit officer revealed in a sworn statement that the bank 
targeted African American borrowers for high-interest loans they could not 
afford because of the pervasive perception at the bank that African American 
customers were not savvy enough to figure out that the loans offered them were 
predatory. See id. at 440 (finding a “prevailing attitude” among lenders that 
“African-American customers weren't savvy enough to know they were getting a 
bad loan” (citing testimony from Michael Powell, Suit Accuses Wells Fargo of 
Steering Blacks to Subprime Mortgages in Baltimore, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2009, 
at A1)). Another loan officer admitted that African Americans who qualified for 
prime loans were targeted for subprime loans because when loan officers 
referred borrowers who qualified for low-interest loans to the subprime division, 
they earned bonuses and higher fees. See id. (finding that loan officers could 
earn “bonuses when they referred borrowers who qualified for low-interest loans 
to the subprime division” (citing reports from Michael Powell, Suit Accuses Wells 
Fargo of Steering Blacks to Subprime Mortgages in Baltimore, N.Y. TIMES, June 
7, 2009, at A1)). “Yet another Wells Fargo loan officer revealed that African 
Americans were called ‘mud people’ and the predatory loans offered them were 
labeled ‘ghetto loans.’” Id. Loan officers targeted black churches also. See id. 
(noting reports that certain corporate divisions did so because Wells Fargo 
believed “church leaders had a lot of influence and could convince congregants to 
take out subprime loans” (citing reports from Michael Powell, Suit Accuses Wells 
Fargo of Steering Blacks to Subprime Mortgages in Baltimore, N.Y. TIMES, June 
7, 2009, at A1))). 
 288. See id. at 437 (noting that this practice predictably resulted in 
borrowers’ inability to repay their mortgages).   
 289. See, e.g., MONIQUE W. MORRIS, NAACP A SUMMARY OF THE DISPARATE 
IMPACT OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGE LENDING ON AFRICAN AMERICANS 2–3 (2009), 
https://action.naacp.org/page/-/resources/Lending_Discrimination.pdf (finding 
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low-interest mortgages were offered subprime loans even though 
they had no or low incomes and no assets.290 Lenders told their 
customers “that they would be able to pay off their mortgages as 
housing prices climbed”.291 But, it became clear that this was not 
true as “the housing bubble burst and housing prices 
plummeted.”292 Predictably, “many borrowers could not repay 
these predatory loans.”293 The mortgages, however, had been 
pooled together to create securities that were sold to investors.294 
Banks and lenders were able to transfer foreseeable risks that 
borrowers would default on the underlying mortgages to investors 
who purchased the securities.295 These are risks that should have 
been anticipated by lenders and the experts who advised them, 
but were understandably unforeseen by borrowers with no 
economic expertise.296  
Billions of dollars in wealth was drained from African 
American and Latino families when banks foreclosed on the 
homes of consumers who were victims of this predatory 
lending.297 Communities were infested with unsightly, abandoned 
                                                                                                     
that African American borrowers were more likely to receive subprime loans 
than similarly-situated white borrowers); Debbie Gruenstein Bocian, Keith S. 
Ernst & Wei Li, Unfair Lending: the Effect of Race and Ethnicity on the Price of 
Subprime Mortgages, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING 3–4 (2006), http://www. 
responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/tools-resources/rr011-Unfair_Lending-
0506.pdf (evaluating several studies and finding that higher-income African 
American and Latino borrowers were more likely to receive higher-rate loans 
than similarly-situated white borrowers). 
 290. See Wade, supra note 84, at 438 (noting that minorities were “targeted” 
specifically for subprime loans). 
 291. See Cheryl D. Wade, Predatory Lending in the Context of Home 
Ownership Continues in 2016 Under Another Name, CORP. JUST. BLOG (May 3, 
2016), http://corporatejusticeblog.blogspot.com/2016/05/predatory-lending-in-
context-of-home.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (examining lending to 
unqualified buyers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 292. Id.  
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. 
 296. See Cheryl L. Wade, How Predatory Mortgage Lending Changed 
African American Communities and Families, 35 HAMLINE L. REV. 437 (2012); 
Cheryl L. Wade, Fiduciary Duty and the Public Interest, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1191 
(2011) (discussing to whom blame is owed for the financial crisis and its adverse 
effects on minority borrowers). 
 297. See Wade, supra note 84, at 438 (describing the expanding wealth gap 
that will result from African Americans losing billions due to subprime lending) 
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homes.298 Investors who purchased mortgage-backed securities 
lost billions.299 Predatory lending harmed local, national, and 
global economies and helped to precipitate the economic 
downturn of 2008.300 
In the aftermath of the predatory mortgage lending that 
targeted African Americans and Latinos, and even after the 
passage of Dodd–Frank, enacted, in part, to address this 
misconduct, the predatory practices used in the mortgage context 
have been replicated in the auto industry.301 Auto dealers often 
connect auto buyers to lenders.302 The dealers are allowed to 
engage in discretionary pricing when setting interest rates and 
there is evidence that dealers charge consumers of color more for 
their auto loans than they charge similarly situated white 
consumers.303  
                                                                                                     
(citing Alan M. White, Borrowing While Black: Applying Fair Lending Laws to 
Risk-Based Mortgage Pricing, 60 S.C. L. REV. 677, 680 (2009) (noting that the 
wealth gap has increased because foreclosures have disproportionately impacted 
African Americans)).   
 298. See Wade, supra note 84, at 440–41 (discussing the increased 
vulnerability that resulted from abandoned homes and the resulting burden on 
law enforcement and cities to deal with the problems). 
 299. See id. at 437–38 (noting the financial crisis’ immense adverse impact 
on global economies). 
 300. See id. at 437 (describing the contributions to the economic downturn 
and underlying effects). 
 301. See Putting an End to Abusive Car Loans, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/opinion/sunday/putting-an-end-to-abusive-
car-loans.html?_r=0 (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (beginning the article by 
declaring auto loans to be a “bastion of predatory lending and racial 
discrimination”) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 302. See id. (discussing how auto dealers and lenders profit by making “auto 
loans that contain hidden figure charges and other essentially useless add-ons 
like credit insurance”). 
 303.  
Data from the late 1990s to early 2000s obtained in nationwide cases 
against the major auto lenders brought by the National Consumer 
Law Center…showed widespread racial disparities, unrelated to 
credit risk, in the markups added by auto dealers to auto loan rates. 
In practices similar to today, the auto dealers had discretion whether 
and how much to markup rates already priced for credit risk by the 
auto lenders.   
NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., RACIAL DISPARITIES IN AUTO LOAN MARKUPS, STATE-
BY-STATE DATA (2005) https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/car_sales/ib-auto-dealers-
racial_disparites.pdf; see also Van Jones, Congress Says ‘OK’ to racist auto 
lenders, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/16/opinions/jones-discrimination-
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Even more disturbing is the fact that predatory conduct in 
the context of home ownership continues in 2016 under another 
name.304 On April 18, 2016, the New York Times reported on a 
relatively new practice that targets low-income homebuyers who 
are now unable to get mortgages because they lost homes in the 
recent downturn, and because banks are now more likely to 
adhere to lending standards.305 The deals allow home sellers to 
provide consumers with high-interest, long-term loans that are 
known as contracts for deed.306 If the consumer can repay the 
loan in installments on time, he or she will own the home.307 But 
two things impede borrowers’ ability to pay on time. First, the 
interest rates are exorbitantly high.308 Once again, we see the 
terribly familiar practice of imposing interest rates that make 
repayment difficult if not impossible.309 Second, many of the 
homes are in a state of disrepair and consumers need to spend 
                                                                                                     
auto-lenders/ (last updated Dec. 16, 2015, 3:31 PM) (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) 
(describing the “solid evidence that black, Latino, and Asian-American car 
buyers are charged higher interest rates than white Americans with similar 
credit histories.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Ally Bank, 
Honda Finance, and Fifth Third Bank settled with the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau and the Department of Justice in order to pay back 
victimized consumers. Id. Toyota has also agreed to pay millions in restitution 
to thousands of consumers of color after charging them interest rates that were 
higher than those charged to white borrowers with similar credit histories. See 
Lisa Lambert, Toyota Motor Credit Settles with U.S. over Racial Bias in Auto 
Loans, REUTERS (Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-consumers-
autofinance-toyota-idUSKCN0VB2EO (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (reporting 
Toyota’s $21.9 million restitution settlement) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 304. See Alexandra Stevenson & Matthew Goldstein, Wall St. Veterans Are 
Betting on Low-Income Homebuyers, N.Y. TIMES, April 18, 2016, at B1 
(introducing the “contracts for deed” concept). 
 305. See id. (finding that banks are now “unwilling to write mortgages to 
riskier clients after being fined billions of dollars for pushing borrowers into 
unaffordable subprime mortgages before the crisis”). 
 306. See id. (describing contracts deeds as those deals where “a seller 
provides the buyer with a long-term, high-interest loan, with the promise of 
actually owning the home at the end of it”). 
 307. Id.  
 308. See id. (referencing the case of a millennial who is required to pay ten 
percent interest under the terms of her contract deed for a house). 
 309. See Wade, supra note 291 (referencing the impossibility of repaying 
some of these predatory loans, but finding continued proliferation nonetheless). 
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money to make the home habitable.310 When a prospective 
homebuyer defaults on the contract for deed, the lender may 
convert the contract to a month-to-month tenancy.311 Even worse, 
the laws that protect homeowners who default on mortgages from 
eviction do not apply in this context.312 
While this practice targets low-income homebuyers, there is 
no reliable information available regarding the race of the 
homebuyers. But, it is likely that a disproportionately large 
number of these homebuyers are consumers of color because, as a 
result of centuries of economic discrimination in the U.S., people 
of color are overrepresented among low-income consumers.313 
The achievement of race, gender, and viewpoint diversity 
among corporate leaders is essential in addressing many of the 
economic disparities that big business has helped to create 
between white Americans and Americans of color.314 Johnson and 
Millon’s work demands this.315 While their work does not focus on 
racial wealth and income gaps, it provides a theoretical 
foundation on which practical considerations and resolutions may 
be fashioned for many corporate governance issues including the 
ones I address in this Essay.316 
                                                                                                     
 310. See Stevenson & Goldstein, supra note 304, at B1. (noting that the 
“homes are often sold “as is,” in need of costly repairs and renovations, and 
many of the transactions end in eviction when buyers fall behind on payments”). 
 311. See id. (discussing how the home sale documents often “did not provide 
buyers with a specified time period to remedy a default, give Harbour the right 
to immediately convert the agreement to a month-to-month tenancy upon a 
default, and include an arbitration clause for settling some disputes”). 
 312. See id. (finding that contracts for deed benefit investment firms 
especially because “contracts, buyers can be evicted if they default on their 
loans. That is very different from traditional mortgages, under which the 
foreclosure process can be lengthy and costly”). 
 313. See Class Divides, ECONOMIST (Nov. 21, 2015), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21678814 (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (discussing 
the past oppression leading to current disadvantages for the black population 
and a resulting “achievement gap” between white Americans and Americans of 
color) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).   
 314. See supra notes 202 and 222 and accompanying text (noting the need 
for diversity and race consciousness at the corporate management level). 
 315. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text (discussing the future 
implications of corporate social responsibility after Hobby Lobby). 
 316. See Johnson, Corporate Personhood, supra note 2 and accompanying 
text (noting how compliance with the law interacts with corporate social 
responsibility).  
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Focusing on the notion of corporate personhood adds a new 
layer of corporate accountability. Consideration of the details of 
the identity of corporate persons helps to hone and refine 
expectations for the corporate person’s social responsibility.317 
Understanding how social constructions of personal identity, 
particularly the social construction of race, illuminates subtle, 
covert, or implicit bias that infects the economic relationships 
between corporations and constituents of color.318 In other words, 
explicit identification of corporations as white, as determined 
culturally in the way natural persons are deemed white, may 
shed light on discriminatory dealings with employees, consumers, 
and communities of color.319  
IX. Conclusion 
In this Essay, I explore the possibility of creating corporate 
cultures that promote rather than suppress racial equity. In 
order for this to happen, business leaders must understand the 
impact that continuing societal discrimination has on corporate 
cultures. Large public companies employ hundreds, sometimes 
thousands of people who will interact with other employees, 
communities and consumers of color, and minority-owned 
businesses.320 Even closely-held, family-owned companies like 
Hobby Lobby and Conestoga employ thousands.321 Implicit or 
                                                                                                     
 317. See supra notes 202 and 233 (arguing for corporate personhood to come 
to grips with race as a component of corporate social responsibility). 
 318. See supra note 205 (arguing for viewing race as a social construction).  
 319. See Wade, supra note 267 (noting that this explicit identification is a 
crucial step in challenging the United States’ persistently discriminatory 
corporate culture). 
 320. See Claire Zillman & Stacy Jones, 7 Fortune 500 Companies with the 
Most Employees, FORTUNE (June 13, 2015), 
http://fortune.com/2015/06/13/fortune-500-most-employees/ (last updated Aug. 
17, 2015 12:03 PM) (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (discussing how, for example, 
retail giants, who have “mammoth rosters” of employees interacting with 
millions of consumers and clients, constitute four of the seven largest companies 
ranked by employment numbers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 321. See Our Story, HOBBY LOBBY, http://www.hobbylobby.com/about-us/our-
story (last visited Apr. 19, 2017) (noting that Hobby Lobby employs 
“approximately 32,000 people”) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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unconscious racism that affects the relationships between 
for-profit companies and their constituents of color is inevitable 
because the individuals who act on behalf of these companies live 
in a nation in which racism and discrimination endure.322 The 
racism that continues to plague our national culture is in some 
instances unconscious, implicit, and subtle.323 Sometimes it is 
blatant and overt. Whatever its manifestation, the racism that 
continues to be part of U.S. culture impacts corporate cultures 
and shapes the relationships between public companies and their 
constituents of color.324  
For-profit companies, however, are a promising locus for 
cultural transformation as it relates to race and racism.325 This is 
because norms are homogenous in the corporate context.326 
Individualism reigns in U.S. culture. But in corporate cultures, 
individuals have to conform to the norms and priorities 
established by the CEO and other senior executives.327 This is 
why a focus on corporate governance is an important first step 
toward racial reconciliation.  
The Hobby Lobby case changes the way we should think 
about corporate governance and corporate social responsibility.328 
                                                                                                     
 322. See Bornstein, supra note 223 (discussing the far-reaching 
consequences to society and those living and doing business within it when 
implicit discrimination is so entrenched). 
 323. See id. (describing in greater detail the various manifestations of 
implicit or unconscious discrimination). 
 324. See supra notes 201 and 224–225 (discussing the disproportionate 
effects felt by stakeholders of color when corporate managers fail to address 
racism). 
 325. See generally Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 364 
(1992) (discussing the view that racism is a permanent feature of the American 
landscape, that black-over-white ascendancy and the need for profits drive it, 
and that the status quo will persist without greater initiative from, among 
others, for-profit companies). 
 326. See Jens Dammann, Homogeneity Effects in Corporate Law, 46 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 1103, 1107 (2014) (finding corporate norms homogenous, and by extension 
compatible, because all corporations use the same corporate law regime that 
empowers executives). 
 327. See id. (arguing that corporate homogeneity is akin to economic utility 
analysis and that corporate law’s general regime evidences the overall corporate 
utility inherent to homogeneity in this respect). 
 328. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014) 
(finding that pursuing objectives besides profit-maximization is permissible and 
even encouraged because those other objectives satisfy the “any lawful purpose” 
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The work of Lyman Johnson and David Millon helps us navigate 
the impact of the Court’s Hobby Lobby decision and extrapolates 
what we need to know about how corporations may be 
governed.329 
After Hobby Lobby, we know that there is no obligation 
under the law to maximize shareholder wealth.330 In fact, 
corporations, even for-profits, may reduce wealth for the sake of 
stakeholders or the general welfare of the public under the 
Court’s reasoning.331 Johnson and Millon noted that this 
approach carries significant implications for companies 
concerned about their social goals and responsibilities.332 
Rejecting the idea that the solitary goal of a for-profit is to 
maximize profits has interesting implications for corporate 
social responsibility advocates.333 Hobby Lobby removes a 
longstanding barrier to corporate social responsibility by 
                                                                                                     
standard). 
 329. See supra notes 1–2 (discussing openings for corporate social 
responsibility after Hobby Lobby allowed corporate goals without sole regard for 
profit maximization). 
 330. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771 (finding that pursuit of religious 
objectives was a worthy goal that was not precluded under corporate law). 
 331. See id. (arguing that disregard for profit-maximization for religious 
objectives could be extended to other worthy objectives as well). 
 332. See supra notes 1–2 (discussing the new corporate landscape and 
openings created by Hobby Lobby). 
 333. The Court’s approach in Hobby Lobby to ideas about shareholder 
primacy and stakeholder theory is also informative. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 
at 2771 (construing state statutes permitting incorporation for “any lawful 
purpose” broadly and unburdened by a restrictive, exclusive shareholder wealth 
maximization objective). The Court rejected shareholder primacy in its 
traditional sense by acknowledging that for-profit corporations do not have to 
defer to shareholder interests and may disregard non-shareholder interests. See 
id. (concluding that modern corporate law does not and cannot impose a 
requirement on corporations to “pursue profit at the expense of everything 
else”). But interestingly, the Court upheld the idea of shareholder primacy in a 
noneconomic sense. See id. (questioning why religious objectives should be 
treated differently than other accepted charitable or altruistic pursuits by 
corporations). The religious objectives of the shareholders of Hobby Lobby and 
Conestoga were paramount. See id. at 2774 (noting the closely held status of the 
companies and the undisputed “sincerity of their religious beliefs”). The 
interests of both companies’ women employees in having access to certain 
contraceptives were not protected. See id. at 2775 (concluding that the HHS 
contraceptive mandate substantially burdened the exercise of religion”). The 
shareholders’ religious objectives prevailed over the interests of stakeholders. 
Id. at 2775.   
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holding that for-profits may pursue other goals as they pursue 
profits.334  
                                                                                                     
 334. See id. at 2771 (finding that worthy objectives are permissible under 
the law and shattering the long-held notion that the sole objective of for-profit 
corporations was to maximize profits, and therefore, maximize shareholder 
wealth). 
